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Abstract
Randomness extractors and error correcting codes are fundamental objects in computer sci-
ence. Recently, there have been several natural generalizations of these objects, in the context
and study of tamper resilient cryptography. These are seeded non-malleable extractors , intro-
duced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09]; seedless non-malleable extractors , introduced by Cheraghchi
and Guruswami [CG14b]; and non-malleable codes , introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and
Wichs [DPW10]. Besides being interesting on their own, they also have important applications
in cryptography. For example, seeded non-malleable extractors are closely related to privacy
amplification with an active adversary, non-malleable codes are related to non-malleable secret
sharing, and seedless non-malleable extractors provide a universal way to construct explicit
non-malleable codes.
However, explicit constructions of non-malleable extractors appear to be hard, and the known
constructions are far behind their non-tampered counterparts. Indeed, the best known seeded
non-malleable extractor requires min-entropy rate at least 0.49 [Li12b]; while explicit construc-
tions of non-malleable two-source extractors were not known even if both sources have full
min-entropy, and was left as an open problem in [CG14b]. In addition, current constructions of
non-malleable codes in the information theoretic setting only deal with the situation where the
codeword is tampered once, and may not be enough for certain applications.
In this paper we make progress towards solving the above problems. Our contributions are
as follows.
• We construct an explicit seeded non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k ≥ log2 n. This
dramatically improves all previous results and gives a simpler 2-round privacy amplification
protocol with optimal entropy loss, matching the best known result in [Li15a].
• We construct the first explicit non-malleable two-source extractor for min-entropy k ≥
n− nΩ(1), with output size nΩ(1) and error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
• We motivate and initiate the study of two natural generalizations of seedless non-malleable
extractors and non-malleable codes, where the sources or the codeword may be tampered
many times. For this, we construct the first explicit non-malleable two-source extractor
with tampering degree t up to nΩ(1), which works for min-entropy k ≥ n − nΩ(1), with
output size nΩ(1) and error 2−n
Ω(1)
. We further show that we can efficiently sample uni-
formly from any pre-image. By the connection in [CG14b], we also obtain the first explicit
non-malleable codes with tampering degree t up to nΩ(1), relative rate nΩ(1)/n, and error
2−n
Ω(1)
.
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1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are fundamental objects in the study of randomness in computation. They
are efficient algorithms that transform imperfect randomness into almost uniform random bits.
Here we use the standard model of weak random source to model imperfect randomness. The
min-entropy of a random variable X is defined as H∞(X) = minx∈Supp(X) log2(1/Pr[X = x]). For
a source X supported on {0, 1}n, we call X an (n,H∞(X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate
H∞(X)/n.
As one can show that no deterministic extractor works for all weak random sources even with
min-entropy k = n− 1, randomness extractors are studied in two different settings. In one setting
the extractor is given a short independent uniform random seed, and these extractors are called
seeded extractors. Informally, a seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy
k and error ǫ takes as input any (n, k) source X and a uniform seed S, and has the property that
|Ext(X,S)−Um| < ǫ, where the distance used is the standard statistical distance. If the output of
the extractor is guaranteed to be close to uniform even after seeing the value of the seed S, then
it is called a strong seeded extractor. In the other setting there is no such random seed, but the
source is assumed to have some special structure. These extractors are called seedless extractors
(see Section 3 for formal definitions). A special kind of seedless extractors that received a lot of
attention is extractors for independent weak random sources. Here one can use the probabilistic
method to show that such extractors exist for only two independent sources (such extractors are
called two-source extractors), but the known constructions are still not optimal.
Both kinds of extractors have been studied extensively, and shown to have many connections
and applications in computer science. For example, seeded extractors can be used to simulate
randomized algorithms with access to only weak random sources, and are closely related to pseu-
dorandom generators, error-correcting code and expanders. Independent source extractors can be
used to generate high quality random bits for distributed computing and cryptography [KLRZ08],
[KLR09], and are closely related to Ramsey graphs and other seedless extractors.
In cryptographic applications, however, one faces a new situation where the inputs of an ex-
tractor may be tampered by an adversary. For example, an adversary may tamper with the seed of
a seeded extractor, or both sources of a two-source extractor. In this case, one natural question is
how the output of the tampered inputs will depend on the output of the initial inputs. In order to
be resilient to adversarial tampering, one natural way is to require that original output of the ex-
tractor be (almost) independent of the tampered output. This leads to the notion of non-malleable
extractors, in both the seeded case and seedless case. These extractors not only are interesting in
their own rights, but also have important applications in cryptography.
Definition 1.1 (Tampering Funtion). For any function f : S → S, f has a fixed point at s ∈ S if
f(s) = s. We say f has no fixed points in T ⊆ S, if f(t) 6= t for all t ∈ T . f has no fixed points if
f(s) 6= s for all s ∈ S.
Seeded non-malleable extractors were introduced by Dodis and Wichs in [DW09], as a general-
ization of strong seeded extractors.
Definition 1.2 (Non-malleable extractor). A function snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is
a seeded non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ǫ if the following holds : If X is a
source on {0, 1}n with min-entropy k and A : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is an arbitrary tampering function
with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Ud) ◦ snmExt(X,A(Ud)) ◦ Ud − Um ◦ snmExt(X,A(Ud)) ◦ Ud| < ǫ
1
where Um is independent of Ud and X.
The original motivation for seeded non-malleable extractors is to study the problem of privacy
amplification with an active adversary. This is a basic problem in information theoretic cryptogra-
phy, where two parties want to communicate with each other to convert their shared secret weak
random source X into shared secret nearly uniform random bits. However, the communication
channel is watched by an adversary Eve, where we assume Eve has unlimited computational power
and the two parties have local (non-shared) uniform random bits.
In the case where Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them), this
problem can be solved by just applying a strong seeded extractor. However, in the case where Eve is
active (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages), the problem becomes much more
complicated. The major goal here is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions as
possible, and output a uniform random string R that has length as close to H∞(X) as possible (the
difference is called entropy loss). There has been extensive research on this problem (we give more
details in Section 1.4). Along the line, a major progress was made by Dodis and Wichs [DW09],
who showed that seeded non-malleable extractors can be used to construct privacy amplification
protocols with optimal round complexity and entropy loss.
This connection makes constructing non-malleable extractors a very promising approach to
privacy amplification. However, all known constructions of such extractors ([DLWZ14], [CRS14],
[Li12a], [DY13], [Li12b]) require the entropy of the weak source to be at least 0.49n. Moreover,
all known constructions are essentially based on known two-source extractors, and the entropy
requirement is exactly the same as the best known two-source extractor [Bou05]. Thus the general
feeling is that to construct explicit seeded non-malleable extractors for smaller entropy may be
difficult, as is the situation for two-source extractors. In this work, somewhat surprisingly, we show
that this is not the case. We dramatically improve all previous results and give explicit seeded
non-malleable extractors that work for any min-entropy k ≥ log2 n. Apart from applications to
cryptography, this may of independent interest due to the connection found between seeded non-
malleable extractors and two-source extractors in [Li12b].
We now discuss the seedless variant of non-malleable extractors. Cheraghchi and Guruswami
[CG14b] introduced seedless non-malleable extractors as a natural generalization of seeded non-
malleable extractors. Furthermore, they found an elegant connection between seedless non-malleable
extractors and non-malleable codes, which are a generalization of error-correcting codes to handle a
much larger class of tampering functions (rather than just bit erasure or modification). Informally,
non-malleable codes are w.r.t a family of tampering functions F , and require that the decoding
of any codeword that is tampered by a function f ∈ F , is either the original message itself or
something totally independent of the message (see Section 1.1). Non-malleable codes have also
been extensively studied recently (we provide more details in Section 1.1), and Cheraghchi and
Guruswami [CG14b] showed a universal way of constructing explicit non-malleable codes by first
constructing non-malleable seedless extractors.
In this paper we focus on one of the most interesting and well studied family of tampering
functions, where the function tampers the original message independently in two separate parts.
This is called the 2-split-state model (see Section 1.1 for a formal discussion). The correspond-
ing seedless non-malleable extractor is then a generalization of two-source extractors, where both
sources can be tampered. For ease of presentation,we present a simplified definition here and we
refer the reader to Section 4 for the formal definition.
Definition 1.3 (Seedless 2-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}n → {0,
1}m is a seedless 2-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error ǫ if it satisfies the following
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property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A = (f, g) is an arbitrary 2-split-state
tampering function, such that at least one of f and g has no fixed points, then
|nmExt(X,Y ) ◦ nmExt(A(X,Y ))− Um ◦ nmExt(f(X), g(Y ))| < ǫ
where both Um’s refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
Again, the connection in [CG14b] makes constructing seedless 2-non-malleable extractors a very
interesting and promising approach to non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model. However,
no explicit constructions of 2-non-malleable extractors were known even when both sources are
perfectly uniform. Indeed, finding an explicit construction of such extractors was left as an open
problem in [CG14b], and none of the known constructions of seeded non-malleable extractors seem
to satisfy this stronger notion. In this paper we solve this open problem and give the first explicit
construction of 2-non-malleable extractors. Furthermore we show that given any output of the
extractor, we can efficiently sample uniformly from its pre-image. By the connection in [CG14b]
this also gives explicit non-malleable codes in the above mentioned well studied 2-split-state model.
We note that our results about non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model do not improve
the already nearly optimal construction in the recent work of Aggarwal et al. [ADKO15]. However,
our construction of seedless 2-non-malleable extractors is of independent interest, and provides a
more direct way to construct non-malleable codes.1
Finally, as in the case of seeded non-malleable extractors [CRS14], we consider the situation
where the sources can be tampered many times. For this, we introduce a natural generalization
of seedless 2-non-malleable extractors which we call seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors (i.e.,
the sources are tampered t times). Correspondingly, in the case of non-malleable codes we also
consider the situation where a codeword can be tampered many times. For this, we also introduce
a natural generalization of non-malleable codes which we call one-many non-malleable codes (see
Section 1.1). We initiate the study of these two objects in this paper and show that one-many
non-malleable codes have several natural and interesting applications in cryptography.
We present a simplified definition of seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors here, and refer the
reader to Section 4 for the formal definition.
Definition 1.4 (Seedless (2,t)-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m is a seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error ǫ if it satisfies the
following property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A1 = (f1, g1), . . . ,At = (ft, gt)
are t arbitrary 2-split-state tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t} at least one of fi
and gi has no fixed points, then
|nmExt(X,Y ),nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))−
Um,nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))| < ǫ,
where both Um’s refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
We provide explicit constructions of seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors for t up to nδ for a
small enough constant δ. Just as the connection between 2-non-malleable extractors and regular
non-malleable codes, we show that these extractors lead to explicit constructions of one-many non-
malleable codes in the 2-split-state model. We note that as in the case of regular non-malleable
1In [ADKO15], non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model are constructed by giving efficient reductions from
the 2-split-state model to t-split-state model, and then using a known constructions of NM codes in the t-split-state
model with almost optimal parameters [CZ14].
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codes, the construction based on (2, t)-non-malleable extractors may not be the only way to con-
struct one-many non-malleable codes. However, it appears non-trivial to extend other existing
constructions of non-malleable codes to satisfy this stronger notion. We discuss this in more details
in Section 1.3.
We now formally define one-many non-malleable codes below.
1.1 Non-malleable codes
We introduce the notion of what we call one-many and many-many non-malleable codes, generaliz-
ing the notion of non-malleable codes introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10].
Since the introduction of non-malleable codes, there has been a flurry of recent work on finding
explicit constructions, resulting in applications to tamper-resilient cryptography [DPW10], robust
versions of secret sharing schemes [ADL14], and connections to the seemingly unrelated area of
derandomization [CG14b]. We discuss prior work in detail in Section 1.5.
We briefly motivate the notion of non-malleable codes. Traditional error-correcting codes encode
a message m into a longer codeword c enabling recovery of m even after part of c is corrupted. We
can view this corruption as a tampering function f acting on the codeword, where f is from some
small allowable family F of tampering functions. The strict requirement of retrieving the encoded
message m imposes restrictions on the kind of tampering functions that can be handled. One might
hope to achieve a weaker goal of only detecting errors, possibly with high probability. However the
notion of error detection fails to work with respect to the family of constant functions since one
cannot hope to detect errors against a function that always outputs some fixed codeword.
The notion of non-malleable codes is an elegant generalization of error-detecting codes. In-
formally, a non-malleable code with respect to a tampering function family F is equipped with
a randomized encoder Enc and a deterministic decoder Dec such that Dec(Enc(m)) = m and for
any tampering function f ∈ F the following holds: for any message m, Dec(f(Enc(m))) is either
the message m or is ǫ-close (in statistical distance) to a distribution Df independent of m. The
parameter ǫ is called the error. Thus, in some sense, either the message arrives correctly, or, the
message is entirely lost and becomes gibberish. A formal definition of non-malleable codes is given
below.
First we define the replace function replace : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. If the second input to
replace is a single value s, replace all occurrences of same⋆ in the first input with s and output the
result. If the second input to replace is a set (s1, . . . , sn), replace all occurrences of same
⋆
i in the
first input with si for all i and output the result.
Definition 1.5 (Coding schemes). Let Enc : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k ∪ {⊥}
be functions such that Enc is a randomized function (i.e. it has access to a private randomness)
and Dec is a deterministic function. We say that (Enc,Dec) is a coding scheme with block length n
and message length k if for all s ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[Dec(Enc(s)) = s] = 1 (the probability is over the
randomness in Enc).
Definition 1.6 (Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length n and message
length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions F ⊂ Fn and error ǫ
if for every f ∈ F there exists a random variable Df on {0, 1}
k ∪ {same⋆} which is independent of
the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0, 1}k, it holds that
|Dec(f(Enc(s)))− replace(Df , s)| ≤ ǫ
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The rate of a non-malleable code C is given by kn . Observe that to construct non-malleable codes,
it is still necessary to restrict the class of tampering functions. This follows since the tampering
function could then use the function Dec to decode the message m, get a message m′ by flipping all
the bits inm, and use the encoding function to pick any codeword in Enc(m′). However presumably,
the class of tampering functions can now be much richer than what was possible for error correction
and error detection.
Tampering Multiple Codewords. Observe that the above definition envisions the adversary
receiving a single codeword Enc(s) and outputting a single tampered codeword f(Enc(s)). We
refer to this as the “one-one” setting. While indeed this is very basic, we argue that this does not
capture scenarios where the adversary may be getting multiple codewords as input or be allowed
to output multiple codewords. As an example, consider the following.
Say there is an auction where each party can submit its bid, and, the item goes to the highest
bidder. An honest party, wishing to bid for value s, encodes its bid using NM codes and sends
Enc(s). This indeed would prevent an adversary (which belongs to an appropriate class of tampering
functions) from constructing his own bid by tampering Enc(s) and coming up with Enc(s+1), which
would completely compromise the sanity of the auction process. However what if the adversary
can submit two bids out of which exactly one is guaranteed to be a winning bid? For example, the
adversary can submit bids to r and 2s − r (for some r not known to the adversary). This is not
ruled out by NM codes!
Towards that end, we introduce a stronger notion which we call one-many NM codes. Intuitively,
this guarantees the following. Consider the set of codewords output by the adversary. We require
that even the joint distribution of the encoded value be independent of the value encoded in the
input. A formal definition is given below:
Definition 1.7 (One-Many Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length
n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions
F ⊂ (Fn)
t and error ǫ if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F , there exists a random variable D~f on ({0,
1}k ∪ {same⋆})t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all messages s ∈ {0,
1}k, it holds that
|(Dec(f1(X)), . . . ,Dec(ft(X))) − replace(D~f , s)| ≤ ǫ
Where X = Enc(s). We refer to t as the tampering degree of the non-malleable code.
We argue that one-many non-malleable codes is a basic notion which is interesting to study
independent of concrete applications. However later we point out some concrete applications to
non-malleable secret sharing (where one wishes to store multiple secrets), and, to witness signatures.
An expert in cryptography by now would have noticed this is analogous to the well studied notion
of one-many non-malleable commitments in the literature. Even though both notions deal with
related concerns, we note non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitment are fundamentally
different objects with the latter necessarily based on complexity assumptions. To start with, we
prove a simple impossibility result for one-many non-malleable codes (whereas for one-many non-
malleable commitments, a corresponding positive result is known [PR08]).
Lemma 1.8. One-many non-malleable codes which work for any arbitrary tampering degree and
ǫ < 1/4 cannot exist for a large class of tampering functions.
Proof. The class of tampering functions which we consider are the ones where each function is
allowed to read any one bit Xi of its choice from the input code X, and output a fresh encoding
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of Xi. Most natural tampering functions (including split state ones [DPW10] [CG14a]) considered
in the literature fall into this class. Assume that the encoded value s has at least 4 possibilities
(length 2 bits or higher). The case of a single bit s is discussed later.
Recall that n is the length of the code. We set t = n. Let X = Enc(s) be the input codeword
where s is chosen at random. We consider n tampering functions where Fi simply reads Xi and
outputs a fresh encoding Wi = Enc(Xi). Now consider (Dec(f1(X)), . . . ,Dec(fn(X))). Observe
that this is exactly the bits of the string X. If the distinguisher applies the decode procedure on
X, it will recover s. Now consider any possible output (d1, . . . , dn) of D~f . Now note that there
cannot exist di which is same
⋆. This is because otherwise it will be replaced by s (see Definition
1.7) which is at least 2 bits while Dec(Wi) is just a single bit. This in turn implies that the value
replace(D~f , s) (from Definition 1.7) is independent of s and X. Thus a distinguisher (given access
to s) can easily have an advantage exceeding ǫ.
For a single bit s, we modify our tampering functions to encode two bits: Wi = Enc(Xi||0).
Then again we can argue that neither of di will be same
⋆ since then it will be replaced by s which
is only one bit. This in turn again implies that replace(D~f , s) is independent of s and X. This
concludes the proof.
We also introduce a natural generalization which we call many-many non-malleable codes. This
refers to the situation where the adversary is given multiple codewords as input.
Definition 1.9 (Many-Many Non-malleable codes). A coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with block length
n and message length k is a non-malleable code with respect to a family of tampering functions
F ⊂ (Fn)
t and error ǫ if for every (f1, . . . ft) ∈ F , there exists a random variable D~f on ({0,
1}k ∪ {same⋆i}i∈[u])
t which is independent of the randomness in Enc such that for all vector of
messages (s1, . . . , su), si ∈ {0, 1}
k, it holds that
|(Dec(f1( ~X)), . . . ,Dec(ft( ~X)))− replace(D~f , (s1, . . . , su))| ≤ ǫ
Where Xi = Enc(si) and ~X = (X1, . . . ,Xu)
Lemma 1.10. One-many non-malleable codes with tampering degree t and error ǫ are also many-
many non-malleable codes for tampering degree t and error uǫ (where u is as in Definition 1.9).
Proof. This proof relies on a simple hybrid argument and the fact that all sources X1, . . . ,Xu are
independent. We only provide a proof sketch here. Assume towards contradiction that there exists
a one-many code with error ǫ, which, under the many-many tampering adversary has error higher
than u.ǫ. That is, the adversary ~(f) is given as input (X1, . . . ,Xu) which are encodings of (s1, . . . ,
su) respectively. This is referred to as the hybrid 0. Now consider the following hybrid experiment.
In the i-th hybrid experiment, the code Xi is changed to be an encoding of 0 (as opposed to be an
encoding of si). We claim that in this experiment, the error changes by at most ǫ. This is because
otherwise we can construct a one-many tampering adversary with error higher than ǫ. To construct
such an adversary ~(f i), each f ij has Xkk 6=i hardcoded in it and takes Xi as input. This would show
an adversary against which one-many non-malleable codes have an error higher than ǫ.
By the time we reach (u − 1)-th hybrid experiment, the error could only have reduced by at
most (u − 1)ǫ. However in the (u − 1)-th hybrid experiment, the error can at most be ǫ since it
corresponds to the one-many setting. Hence, the error in the hybrid 0 could have been at most u.ǫ.
This concludes the proof.
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Non-malleable codes in the split-state model An important and well studied family of
tampering functions (which is also relevant to the current work) is the family of tampering functions
in the C-split-state model, for C ≥ 2. In this model, each tampering function f is of the form
(f1, . . . , fC) where fi ∈ Fn/C , and for any codeword x = (x1, . . . , xC) ∈ ({0, 1}
n/C )C we define (f1,
. . . , fC)(x1, . . . , xC) = (f1(x1), . . . , fC(xC)). Thus each fi independently tampers a fixed partition
of the codeword. Non-malleable codes in this model can also be viewed as non-malleable secret
sharing. This is because the strings (x1, . . . , xC) can be seen as the shares of s and tampering each
share individually does not allow one to “maul” the shared secret s.
There has been a lot of recent work on constructing explicit and efficient non malleable codes
in the C-split-state model. Since C = 1 includes all of Fn, the best one can hope for is C = 2. A
Monte-Carlo construction of non-malleable codes in this model was given in the original paper on
non-malleable codes [DPW10] for C = 2 and then improved in [CG14a]. However, both of these
constructions are inefficient. For C = 2, these Monte-Carlo constructions imply existence of codes
of rate close to 12 and corresponds to the hardest case. On the other extreme, when C = n, it
corresponds to the case of bit tampering where each function fi acts independently on a particular
bit of the codeword. By a recent line of work [DKO13] [ADL14] [CG14b] [CZ14] [ADKO15], we
now have almost optimal constructions of non-malleable codes in the C-state-state model, for any
C ≥ 2.
We remark that all the prior work in the information theoretic setting has only considered the
construction of what we call one-one NM codes in the split state model2. That is, the adversary
is only given as input a single codeword and outputs a single codeword. Our new notions seek to
remedy that fact.
Many-many non-malleable secret sharing. Consider the example of non-malleable secret
sharing. What if there are shares of multiple secrets which the adversary can tamper with? What
if the adversary is allowed to output shares of multiple secrets? For example, say there are two
secret and two devices. Each device stores one share of each of the secrets. Say that an adversary
is able to tamper with the data stored on each device individually (or infect each of them with a
virus). Then, the current notion of one-one NM codes does not rule out a non-trivial relationship
between two resulting secrets and the two original secrets we start with. It is conceivable that
what we need here is a two-two non-malleable secret sharing. Our many-many non-malleable codes
directly lead to such a many-many non-malleable secret sharing.
Subsequent Work. The notion of one-many non-malleable codes has been used to construct
witness signatures [GJK15]. Very roughly, witness signatures allow any party with a witness to
some NP statement, to sign a message such that anyone can verify that the message was indeed
signed using a valid witness to the NP statement. On the other hand, the signatures should still be
unforgeable: that is, producing a signature on a new message (even given several message, signature
pairs) should be as hard as computing a witness to the NP statement itself. There is no setup or
any key generation involved. Witness signatures can be seen as an analogue of the notion of witness
encryption [GGSW13] for signatures. The notion of witness signatures was introduced in [GJK15]
who used one-many non-malleable codes to propose a construction in the tamper proof hardware
model. The fact that non-malleable codes satisfy one-many security (as opposed to just one-one)
was crucial in their work.
2A notion called as continuous non-malleable codes was considered in [FMNV14] where a codeword is tampered
multiple times, but the experiment stops whenever an error message is encountered. The constructions provided for
continuous non-malleable codes are in the computational setting. We discuss this in Section 1.5
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1.2 Summary of results
Our first main result is an explicit construction of a (2, t)-seedless non-malleable extractor. We note
that prior to this work, such a construction was not known for even t = 1 and full min-entropy.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ nγ, there exists an
efficient seedless (2, t)-NM extractor at min-entropy n − nγ with error 2−n
Ω(1)
and output length
m = nΩ(1).
Next, we show that it is possible to efficiently sample almost uniformly from the pre-image of
any output of this extractor. We prove this in Section 8. Combining this with Theorem 5.1 and a
hybrid argument, we immediately have the following result.
Theorem 2. There exists a constant γ > 0 such that for all n > 0 and t ≤ nγ, there exists an
efficient construction of one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model with tampering
degree t, relative rate nΩ(1)/n, and error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
We next improve the min-entropy rate requirements of seeded non-malleable extractors. As
mentioned above, prior to this work, the best known such construction worked for min-entropy rate
0.499 [Li12b]. We have the following result.
Theorem 3. There exists a constant c such that for all n > 0 and ǫ > 0, and k ≥ c log2
(
n
ǫ
)
, there
exists an explicit construction of a seeded non-malleable extractor snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0,
1}m, with m = Ω(k) and d = O
(
log2
(
n
ǫ
))
.
We in fact have a more general result, and can handle t-adversarial functions in the seeded
non-malleable case as well, which improves a result of [CRS14]. We refer the reader to Section 7
for more details.
Combined with the protocol developed in [DW09], this immediately gives the following result
about privacy amplification, which matches the best known result in [Li15a] but has a simpler
protocol.
Theorem 4. There exists a constant C such that for any ε > 0 with k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ε))2,
there exists an explicit 2-round privacy amplification protocol with an active adversary for (n, k)
sources, with security parameter log(1/ε) and entropy loss O(log n+ log(1/ε)).
1.3 Other possible approaches to construct one-many non-malleable codes
Since a major part of this paper is devoted to constructing explicit seedless (2, t)-non-malleable
extractors (and providing efficient sampling algorithms for almost uniformly sampling from the pre-
image of any output), and one of the major motivation for such explicit extractors is to construct
one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model, a natural question is whether existing
constructions of non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model can be modified to satisfy the
stronger notion of one-many non-malleable codes.
Our first observation is that not every construction of a one-one non-malleable code satisfies
the stronger notion of being a one-many non-malleable code. Intuitively this is because, say Enc
and Dec are the encoding and decoding function of some non-malleable code against some class of
tampering functions F . Thus, for f1, f2 ∈ F , and any message m, Dec(f1(Enc(m))) is close to Dfi ,
i = 1, 2. But it is possible this does not rule out the possibility that, for instance Dec(f2(Enc(m))) =
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Dec(f1(Enc(m))) +m+ 1. Clearly, this code is not non-malleable against two adversaries from F ,
and hence is not one-many.
We now take a specific example. Suppose C is a one-one NM code against 2-split-state adver-
saries. We construct another code C′ where the message m is broken into m1 and m2 using additive
secret sharing. Then one encodes both m1 and m2 separately using the encoder of C (and includes
both as part of the code, each encoding being equally divided in two halves). It is easy to show
that C′ is still one-one NM.
On the other hand, if the two adversaries act in the following way: one adversary can take the
encoding of m1 and put an encoding of 1 on his own. That will be the first output code (to message
m1 + 1). Next, the other adversary can take the encoding of m2 and put an encoding of 0 on its
own. That will be second output code (to message m2). Now it can be seen that the two output
code sum to m+ 1. Thus, C′ is not one-many in the 2-split-state model.
It turns out that existing constructions of non-malleable codes in the split-state model either
fail to satisfy stronger notion of one-many, or at least it appears non-trivial to generalize the proofs
of non-malleability against multiple adversaries. We briefly discuss these approaches, and why
it appears non-trivial to extend them to handle multiple adversaries. A first approach could be
to generalise the reductions in the recent work of Aggarwal et al.[ADKO15], and possibly show
that one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model can be reduced to the problem of
constructing one-many non-malleable codes in the bit-tampering model. However, each known
construction of a NM code in the bit-tampering model [CG14b] [AGM+14] follows the general
approach of starting out with an initial non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model (which is also
an NM code against bit-wise tampering) of possibly low rate, and then amplifies the rate to almost
optimal. Thus, it is not clear how to use this approach to construct one-many NM codes in the
2-split-state model.
Another approach could be to show that the non-malleable codes constructed by Aggarwal et
al. [ADL14] generalize to handle many adversaries. However, from a careful examination of their
proof it turns out that it is crucially used that the inner product function is an extractor for weak
sources at min-entropy rate slightly greater than 12 . It turns out that this fact is tailor made for
exactly one adversary, and for handling t > 1 adversaries one needs that the inner product function
is an extractor for min-entropy rate approximately 1t+1 , which is not true. Thus, it is not clear how
to extend their approach as well.
Finally, a third approach could be to extend the construction of the seedless non-malleable
extractor for 10 sources in the work of Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14]. However, from
a careful examination of the proof it follows that the crucial step of first constructing a seedless
non-malleable condenser based on a sum-product theorem fails to generalize when there are more
than one adversary.
Thus, it appears that our new explicit constructions of seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors
are a necessity for constructing one-many non-malleable codes in the split-state model.
1.4 Related work on privacy amplification
As mentioned above, seeded non-malleable extractors were introduced by Dodis and Wichs in
[DW09], to study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary.
The goal is roughly as follows. We pick a security parameter s, and if the adversary Eve
remains passive during the protocol then the two parties should achieve shared secret random bits
that are 2−s-close to uniform. On the other hand, if Eve is active, then the probability that Eve
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can successfully make the two parties output two different strings without being detected is at most
2−s. We refer the readers to [DLWZ14] for a formal definition.
Here, while one can still design protocols for an active adversary, the major goal is to design a
protocol that uses as few number of interactions as possible, and output a uniform random string
R that has length as close to H∞(X) as possible (the difference is called entropy loss). When the
entropy rate of X is large, i.e., bigger than 1/2, there exist protocols that take only one round
(e.g., [MW97], [DKRS06]). However these protocols all have very large entropy loss. On the other
hand, [DW09] showed that when the entropy rate of X is smaller than 1/2, then no one round
protocol exists; furthermore the length of R has to be at least O(s) smaller than H∞(X). Thus,
the natural goal is to design a two-round protocol with such optimal entropy loss. There has been
a lot of effort along this line [MW97], [DKRS06], [DW09], [RW03], [KR09], [CKOR10], [DLWZ14],
[CRS14], [Li12a], [Li12b]. However, all protocols before the work of [DLWZ14] either need to use
O(s) rounds, or need to incur an entropy loss of O(s2).
In [DW09], Dodis and Wichs showed that the previously defined seeded non-malleable extractor
can be used to construct 2-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss. They
further showed that seeded non-malleable extractors exist when k > 2m + 3 log(1/ε) + log d + 9
and d > log(n− k + 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 7. However, they were not able to construct such extractors.
The first explicit construction of seeded non-malleable extractors appeared in [DLWZ14], with
subsequent improvements in [CRS14], [Li12a], [DY13]. However, all these constructions require
the entropy rate of the weak source to be bigger than 1/2. In another paper, Li [Li12b] gave
the first explicit non-malleable extractor that breaks this barrier, which works for entropy rate
1/2 − δ) for some constant δ > 0. This is the best known seeded non-malleable extractor to date.
Further, [Li12b] also showed a connection between seeded non-malleable extractors and two-source
extractors, which suggests that constructing explicit seeded non-malleable extractors with small
seed length for smaller entropy may be hard.
In a different line of work, Li [Li12a] introduced the notion of non-malleable condenser , which is
a weaker object than seeded non-malleable extractor. He then constructed explicit non-malleable
condensers for entropy as small as k = polylog(n) in [Li15a] and used them to give the first
two-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss, subject to the constraint that
k ≥ s2.
1.5 Related work on non-malleable codes
We give a summary of known constructions of non-malleable codes. As remarked above, all known
explicit constructions of non-malleable codes in the information theoretic setting are in framework
of what we call as one-one non-malleable codes. That is, the adversary is only given as input a
single code and outputs a single code.
Since the introduction of non-malleable codes by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10],
the most well studied model is the C-split-state model introduced above. By a recent line of
work [DKO13] [ADL14] [CG14b] [CZ14] [ADKO15], we now have almost optimal constructions of
non-malleable codes in the C-state-state model, for any C ≥ 2.
In the model of global tampering, Agrawal et al. [AGM+14] constructed efficient non-malleable
codes with rate 1−o(1) against a class of tampering functions slightly more general than the family
of permutations.
A notion related to the many-many setting we consider in this work, called as continuous non-
malleable codes, was introduced by Faust et al. [FMNV14]. In a continuous non-malleable code,
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the codewords was allowed to be tampered multiple times, but the tampering experiment stops
whenever an error message is detected. Thus this model is weaker than the notion we consider. The
constructions provided of continuous non-malleable codes in [FMNV14] are under computational
assumptions.
There were also some other conditional results. Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12] constructed effi-
cient constant rate non-malleable codes in the split-state model against computationally bounded
adversaries under strong cryptographic assumptions. The work of Faust et al. [FMVW13] con-
structed almost optimal non-malleable codes against the class of polynomial sized circuits in the
CRS framework. [CCP12], [CCFP11], [CKM11], and [FMNV14] considered non-malleable codes in
other models.
The recent work of Chandran et al. [CGM+15] found interesting connections between non-
malleable codes in a model slightly more general than the split-wise model and non-malleable
commitment schemes.
Organization
We give an overview of all our explicit constructions in Section 2. We introduce some preliminaries
in Section 3, and formally define seeded and seedless non-malleable extractors in Section 4. We use
Section 5 to present the connection between seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors and one-many
non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model. In Section 6, we present an explicit construction of a
seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor. An explicit construction of a seeded non-malleable extractor
construction at polylogarithmic min-entropy is presented in Section 7. Finally, we use Section 8 to
give efficient encoding and decoding algorithms for the resulting one-many non-malleable codes.
2 Overview of Our Constructions
In this section, we give an overview of the main ideas involved in our constructions. The main
ingredient in all our constructions is an explicit seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor. Further, we
give efficient algorithms for almost uniformly sampling from the pre-image of any output of this
extractor. The explicit construction of many-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model
with tampering degree t then follow in a straightforward way using the connection via Theorem
5.1.
It turns out that by a simple modification of the construction of our seedless non-malleable
extractor, we also have an explicit construction of a seeded non-malleable extractor which works
for any min-entropy k ≥ log2 n. We will give an overview of how to achieve this as well.
2.1 A Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor
Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large enough one. Let t = nγ/C .
We construct an explicit function nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = nΩ(1) which satisfies
the following property: If X and Y be independent (n, n − nγ)-sources on {0, 1}n, and A1 = (f1,
g1), . . . ,At = (ft, gt) are arbitrary 2-split sate tampering functions such that for any i ∈ [t], at least
one of fi or gi has no fixed points, the following holds:
|nmExt(X,Y ) ◦ nmExt(A1(X,Y )) ◦ . . . nmExt(At(X,Y ))−
Um ◦ nmExt(A1(X,Y )) ◦ . . . nmExt(At(X,Y ))| ≤ ǫ,
11
where ǫ = 2−n
Ω(1)
.
By a convex combination argument (Lemma 6.14), we show that if nmExt satisfies the property
above, then it is indeed a seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor (Definition 4.4).
We introduce some notation.
Notation: For any function H, and V = H(X,Y ), we use V (i) to denote the random variable
H(Ai(X,Y )). If Za, Za+1, . . . , Zb are random variables, we use Z[a,b] to denote the random variable
(Za, . . . , Zb). For any bit string z, let z{h} denote the symbol in the h’th co-ordinate of x. For a
string x of length m, and T ⊆ [m], let x{T} be the projection of x onto the co-ordinates indexed
by T . For a string x of length m, define the string Slice(x,w) to be the prefix of x with length w.
The high level idea of the non-malleable extractor is as follows. Initially we have two independent
sources (X,Y ) and t tampered version {Ai(X,Y )}, which can depend arbitrarily on (X,Y ). We
would like to gradually break the dependence of {Ai(X,Y )} on (X,Y ), until at the end we get an
output nmExt(X,Y ) which is independent of all {nmExt(Ai(X,Y ))}.
Towards this end, we would first like to create something from (X,Y ) that can distinguish from
{Ai(X,Y )}. More specifically, we will obtain a small string Z of length n
Ω(1) from (X,Y ), such
that with high probability Z is different from all {Z(i)} obtained from {Ai(X,Y )}. Next, we will
run some iterative steps of extraction from (X,Y ), with each step based on one bit of Z. The
crucial property we will have here is that whenever we reach a bit of Z which is different from
the corresponding bits of {Z(i), i ∈ S} for some subset S ⊆ [t], in that particular step the output
of our extraction from (X,Y ) will be (close to) uniform and independent of all the corresponding
outputs obtained from {Ai(X,Y ), i ∈ S}. Furthermore this will remain true in all subsequent
steps of extraction. Therefore, since Z is different from all {Z(i), i ∈ [t]}, we know that at the end
our output nmExt(X,Y ) will be independent of all {nmExt(Ai(X,Y )), i ∈ [t]}. We now elaborate
about the two steps in more details below.
Step 1: Here we use the sources X and Y to obtain a random variable Z, such that for each
i ∈ [t], Z 6= Z(i) with probability at least 1 − 2−n
Ω(1)
. Thus by a union bound with probability
1− 2−n
Ω(1)
we have that Z is different form all {Z(i), i ∈ [t]}. To obtain Z, we first take two small
slices X1 and Y1 from the sources X and Y respectively, with size at least 3n
γ ; and use the strong
inner product 2-source extractor IP to generate an almost uniform random variable V = IP(X,
Y ). Now we take an explicit asymptotically good binary linear error correcting code, and obtain
encodings (E(X), E(Y )) of (X,Y ) respectively. We now use V to pseudorandomly sample nΩ(1)
bits from E(X) to obtain X2, and we do the same thing to obtain Y2 from E(Y ). We use known
constructions of an averaging sampler Samp [Zuc97] [Vad04] (see Definition 8.4) to do this (in fact,
we can even sample completely randomly since V is close to uniform).
Now define
Z = X1 ◦ Y1 ◦X2 ◦ Y2.
The length of Z is ℓ = nβ bits for some small constant β. Fix some i ∈ [t]. We claim that Z 6= Z(i)
with probability at least 1− 2−n
Ω(1)
. To see this, assume without loss of generality that fi has no
fixed points. If X1 6= X
(i)
1 or Y1 6= Y
(i)
1 , then we have Z 6= Z
(i). Now suppose X1 = X
(i)
1 and
Y1 = Y
(i)
1 . Thus, V = V
(i). We fix X1, since IP is a strong extractor (Theorem 3.17), V is still
close to uniform and now it is a function of Y , and thus independent of X. Since X 6= X(i), by the
property of the code, we know that E(X) and E(X(i)) must differ in at least a constant fraction of
co-ordinates. Thus, if we uniformly (or pseudorandomly) sample nΩ(1) bits from these coordinates,
then with probability 1− 2−n
Ω(1)
the sampled strings will be different.
We can now fix Z, {Z(i) : i ∈ [t]}, such that Z 6= Z(i) for any i. Since the size of each Z(i) is
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small, we have that conditioned on this fixing, the sources X and Y are still independent and have
min-entropy at least n−O(tℓ) each (with high probability).
Step 2: Here our goal is to gradually break the dependence of {Ai(X,Y )} on (X,Y ), until at the
end we get an output nmExt(X,Y ) which is independent of all {nmExt(Ai(X,Y ))}. To achieve
this, our crucial observation is that while many other techniques in constructing non-malleable
seeded extractors (such as those in [DLWZ14], [CRS14], [Li12b] fail in the case where both sources
are tampered, the powerful technique of alternating extraction still works. Thus, we will be relying
on this technique, which has been used a lot in recent studies of extractors and privacy amplification
[DW09], [Li12a], [Li12b], [Li13b], [Li13a], [Li15b]. We now briefly recall the details. The alternating
extraction protocol is an interactive protocol between two parties, Quentin and Wendy, using two
strong seeded extractors Extq, Extw. Assume initially Wendy has a weak source X and Quentin
has another source Q and a short uniform random string S1.
3 Suppose that X is independent of
(Q,S1). In the first round, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R1 = Extw(X,S1) and
sends it back to Quentin, and Quentin then computes S2 = Extq(Q,R1). Continuing in this way, in
round i, Quentin sends Si, Wendy computes the random variables Ri = Extw(X,Si) and sends it
to Quentin, and Quentin then computes the random variable Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri). This is done for
some u steps, and each of the random variables Ri, Si is of length m. Thus, the following sequence
of random variables is generated:
S1, R1 = Extw(X,S1), S2 = Extq(Q,R1), . . . , Su = Extq(Q,Ru−1), Ru = Extw(X,Su).
Also define the following look-ahead extractor:
laExt(X, (Q,S1)) = R1, . . . , Ru
Now suppose we have t tampered versions of X: X(1), . . . ,X(t), which can depend on X arbitrar-
ily; and t tampered versions of (Q,S1): (Q
(1), S
(1)
1 ), . . . , (Q
(t), S
(t)
1 ), which can depend on (Q,S1)
arbitrarily. Let laExt(X, (Q,S1)) = R1, . . . , Ru, and for h ∈ [t], let laExt(X
(h), (Q(h), S
(h)
1 )) = R
(h)
1 ,
. . . , R
(h)
t . As long as (X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent of ((Q,S1), (Q
(1), S
(1)
1 ), . . . , (Q
(t), S
(t)
1 )) and
t, u,m are small compared to the entropy of X and Q, one can use induction together with standard
properties of strong seeded extractors to show that the following holds: for any j ∈ [u],
Rj , {R
(h)
i : i ∈ [j − 1], h ∈ [t]}, {(Q
(h), S
(h)
1 ) : h ∈ [t]}
≈ Um, {R
(h)
i : i ∈ [j − 1], h ∈ [t]}, {(Q
(h), S
(h)
1 ) : h ∈ [t]}
Based on this property, we describe two different approaches to achieve our goal in Step 2. The
first approach was our initial construction, while the second approach is inspired by new techniques
in a recent work of Cohen [Coh15]. It turns out the second approach is simpler and more suitable
for our application to many-many non-malleable codes, thus we only provide the formal proof for
the second approach in this paper (see Section 6). Recall that the high level idea in both approaches
is that we will proceed bit by bit based on the previously obtained string Z, which is different from
all {Z(i), i ∈ [t]}. Whenever we reach a bit of Z which is different from the corresponding bits of
{Z(i), i ∈ S} for some subset S ⊆ [t], in that particular step the output of our extraction from
(X,Y ) will be (close to) uniform and independent of all the corresponding outputs obtained from
{Ai(X,Y ), i ∈ S}. Furthermore this will remain true in all subsequent steps of extraction. We will
achieve this by running some alternating extraction protocol for ℓ times, where ℓ is the length of
3In fact, S1 can be a slightly weak random source as well.
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Z. Each time the alternating extraction will be between X and a new (Qh, S1,h) obtained from Y ,
where we take S1,h to be a small slice of Qh.
Construction 1:4 Our first approach is based on a generalization of the techniques in [Li13a].
Here we fist achieve an intermediate goal: whenever we reach a bit of Z which is different from
the corresponding bits of {Z(i), i ∈ S} for some subset S ⊆ [t], the output of our extraction from
(X,Y ) will have some entropy conditioned on all the corresponding outputs obtained from {Ai(X,
Y ), i ∈ S}. Suppose at step h (1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ) we have obtained Qh from Y (in the first step we can
take a small slice of Y to be Q1) and use it to run an alternating extraction protocol with X. We
run the alternating extraction for t + 2 rounds and obtain outputs Rh,1, . . . , Rh,t+2. The crucial
idea is to use the h’th bit of Z, to set a random variable Wh as either (Rh,1, . . . , Rh,t+1) or Rh,t+2
(appended with an appropriate number of 0’s to make them the same length).
Now consider the subset S ⊆ [t] where the h’th bit of Z is different from the h’th bit of {Z(i),
i ∈ S}. If Wh = (Rh,1, . . . , Rh,t+1) then for all i ∈ S, we have W
(i)
h = R
(i)
h,t+2. Since S has at most t
elements, the size of {W
(i)
h } is at most tm. Note that Wh has size (t+1)m and is close to uniform.
Thus Wh has entropy roughly m conditioned on {W
(i)
h , i ∈ S} (here we can ignore the appended
0’s in W
(i)
h since they won’t affect the entropy in Wh). On the other hand, if then Wh = Rh,t+2
then for all i ∈ S, we have W
(i)
h = R
(i)
h,1, . . . , R
(i)
h,t+1. By the property of alternating extraction we
have that Wh is close to uniform conditioned on {W
(i)
h , i ∈ S}.
We can now go from having conditional entropy to being conditional uniform, as follows. We first
convertWh into a somewhere random source by applying an optimal seeded extractor and trying all
possible choices of the seed. One can show that conditioned on previous random variables generated
in our algorithm, Wh is now a deterministic function of X and thus independent of Y and Qh. We
now take another optimal seeded extractor and use each row in this somewhere random source as
a seed to extract a longer output from Qh. In this way we obtain a new somewhere random source.
If we choose parameters appropriately we can ensure that the size of Wh is much smaller than the
entropy of Qh, and thus the number of rows in this new somewhere random source is much smaller
than its row length. Therefore, by using an extractor from [BRSW06] we can use this somewhere
random source to extract a close to uniform output Vh from X. Since Wh has entropy at least m
conditioned on {W
(i)
h , i ∈ S}, as long as the size of Vh is small, using standard arguments one can
show that Vh will be close to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}.
We now go into the next step of alternating extraction, where we will take a strong seeded
extractor and use Vh to extract a uniform string Qh+1 from Y . We will then use X and Qh+1 to
do the alternating extraction for next step. The point here is that whenever we have Vh is close
to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S} for some S ⊆ [t], we can show that Qh+1 is close to
uniform conditioned on all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}. Thus in the next step of alternating extraction, we can
first fix all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}, and then fix all the {R
(i)
h+1,j, i ∈ [S], j ∈ [t+2]}, and all the {V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}
(these will now be deterministic functions of X). Conditioned on this fixing Qh+1 is still close to
uniform, and X still has a lot of entropy left (as long as the size of each R
(i)
h+1,j and V
(i)
h+1 is small).
Therefore, in this step Vh+1 will be close to uniform even conditioned on all {V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}, i.e., once
we have independence it will continue to hold in subsequent steps. Thus our goal is achieved.
Construction 2: Here we replace our approach in Construction 1 with a more direct approach,
by using the idea of “flip-flop” alternating extraction introduced in a recent paper by Cohen [Coh15],
4formal proofs of the claims in the sketch of Construction 1 are not provided in this paper.
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which is again based on the techniques developed in [Li13a]. Again, assume we are now looking at
the h’th bit of Z, and we have obtained Qh from Y .
Now each step of alternating extraction will consist of two sub steps of alternating extraction,
with each sub step taking two rounds. In the first sub step, we use X and Qh to perform an
alternating extraction for two rounds and output Rh,1, Rh,2. If the h’th bit of Z is 0, we take
Vh = Rh,1; otherwise we take Vh = Rh,2. Now we will take a strong seeded extractor Ext and use
Vh to extract Qh = Ext(Y, Vh) from Y . We then use Qh and X to perform the second sub step of
alternating extraction, which again runs for two rounds and outputs Rh,1, Rh,2. Now if the h’th bit
of Z is 0, we take V h = Rh,2; otherwise we take V h = Rh,1. One can see that this is indeed in a
“flip-flop” manner.
The idea is as follows. Consider the h’th bit of Z, and let S ⊆ [t] be such that for all i ∈ S, we
have Z{h} 6= Z
(i)
{h}. Now consider the h’th step of alternating extraction. If Z{h} = 0, then in the
first sub step of alternating extraction, Vh = Rh,1; while for all i ∈ S, we have V
(i)
h = R
(i)
h,2. Now
it’s possible that Vh depends on {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}, and thus Qh also depends on {Q
(i)
h , i ∈ S}. However,
when we go into the second sub step of alternating extraction, we will choose V h = Rh,2; while for
all i ∈ S, we have V
(i)
h = R
(i)
h,1. Thus by the property of alternating extraction, we have that V h is
close to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}.
On the other hand, if Z{h} = 1, then in the first sub step of alternating extraction, Vh = Rh,2;
while for all i ∈ S, we have V
(i)
h = R
(i)
h,1. Thus in this sub step, by the property of alternating
extraction, we have that Vh is close to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}. Therefore we
also have that Qh is close to uniform conditioned on all {Q
(i)
h , i ∈ S}, and they are deterministic
functions of Y given Vh and {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}. Thus, when we go into the second sub step of alternating
extraction, we can first fix all {Q
(i)
h , i ∈ S} and Qh is still close to uniform. Now all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}
will be deterministic functions of X, and thus we can further fix them. As long as the size of each
Rh,j is small, conditioned on this fixing X still has a lot of entropy left. Therefore Qh can still
be used to perform an alternating extraction with X, and this gives us that V h = Rh,1 is close to
uniform. That is, again we get that V h is close to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}.
Once we have this property, we can go into the next step of alternating extraction. We will
now take a strong seeded extractor and use V h to extract Qh+1 from Y , and then use X and Qh+1
to perform the next step of alternating extraction. Since V h is close to uniform conditioned on all
{V
(i)
h , i ∈ S}, we also have that Qh+1 is close to uniform conditioned on all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}. Thus by
the same argument above, we can first fix all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S} and all {V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}, and conditioned
on this fixing Qh+1 is still close to uniform. Therefore Vh+1 will be close to uniform conditioned
on all {V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}. Thus, going into the second sub step, we will also have that Qh+1 is close
to uniform conditioned on all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}. Thus again we can first fix all {Q
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S} and all
{V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}, and conditioned on this fixing Qh+1 is still close to uniform. Therefore we get that
V h+1 is close to uniform conditioned on all {V
(i)
h+1, i ∈ S}, i.e., once we have independence it will
continue to hold in subsequent steps. Thus our goal is achieved.
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2.2 An Explicit Seeded Non-Malleable Extractor for Polylogarithmic Min-Entropy
Let γ > 0 be a small constant. For any ǫ > 0, let k ≥ O
(
log2+γ
(
n
ǫ
))
, t ≤ kγ/2 and d =
O
(
t2 log2(nǫ )
)
. We construct a function snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, m = O
(
log
(
n
ǫ
))
,
such that the following holds: If X is a (n, k)-source, Y is an independent uniform seed of length
d, and A1, . . . ,At are arbitrary functions with no fixed points, then the following holds:
snmExt(X,Y ), snmExt(X,A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X,At(y))
≈ǫ Um, snmExt(X,A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X,At(y))
We now describe our construction, which is essentially a simple modification of our seedless
non-malleable extractor construction.
Step 1: Let Y1 be a small slice of Y . Compute V = Ext(X,Y1), where Ext is a strong seeded
extractor. Now we use V to randomly sample bits from E(Y ), where E is the encoder of an
asymptotically good error correcting code. Let the sampled bits be Y2. We define
Z = Y1 ◦ Y2
We show that with high probability Z 6= Z(i) for all i ∈ [t]. We provide a brief sketch of the
argument. Fix any i ∈ [t]. If Y1 6= Y
(i)
1 , then clearly Z 6= Z
(i). Now suppose Y1 = Y
(i)
1 . We fix
Y1, and since Ext is a strong seeded extractor, it follows that V is still close to uniform, and is a
deterministic function of X, thus independent of Y, {Y i, i ∈ [t]}. Therefore V can be used to sample
bits from Y . Since Ai has no fixed points, it follows that Y 6= Y
(i). Thus E(Y ) and E(Y (i)) must
differ in at least a constant fraction of coordinates. Therefore with high probability Y2 6= Y
(i)
2 . By
a union bound, with high probability Z 6= Z(i) for all i ∈ [t].
Step 2: As long as the size of (Y1, V, Y2) is small, we can show that conditioned on the fixing of
these variables, X and Y are still independent. Moreover both X and Y only lose a small amount of
entropy. Now we can use any of Construction 1 and Construction 2 above to finish the extraction.
The same argument will show that at the end snmExt(X,Y ) will be close to uniform conditioned
on all {snmExt(A,Ai(Y )), i ∈ [t]}.
We refer the reader to Section 7 for more details.
Comparison to the LCB in [Coh15] Our second approach in constructing non-malleable
two-source extractors is inspired by the work of [Coh15]. Especially, we use the idea of “flip-
flop” alternating extraction introduced there. However, there are also some differences between our
construction and the “Local Correlation Breaker” constructed in [Coh15], which are worth pointing
out.
First, in our construction, both sources X and Y are tampered. This results in t random
variables X(1), . . . ,X(t) that are arbitrarily correlated with X, and t random variables Y (1), . . . ,
Y (t) that are arbitrarily correlated with Y . In contrast, in the case of Local Correlation Breaker
constructed in [Coh15], there are only correlated random variables with one source, while the other
source is not tampered. In this sense, our construction can actually be viewed as given a stronger
version of the LCB.
Second, the way to obtain a string that distinguishes the correlated parts is quite different. In
the case of the LCB, one can simply use the index of each row in the somewhere random source.
On the other hand, in our case we do not have such an index, since the only access we have are the
two sources X and Y . Thus, we have to take extra efforts to create such a string from these two
sources, by using error correcting codes and random sampling.
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2.3 Efficient Algorithms for Many-Many Non-Malleable Codes
The above construction gives a (2, t) non-malleable extractor. However, for our application to
constructing explicit many-many non-malleable codes, given any output of the extractor we need
to efficiently sample (almost) uniformly from its pre-image. To do this using the construction
described above is highly non-trivial. Therefore, in order to make it easy to efficiently sample from
the pre-image of an output (i.e., “inverting” the extractor), we use additional ideas to modify the
non-malleable extractor. We now briefly describe the main ideas that we use. Recall that t is the
number of tampered versions of the sources, and ℓ is the length of the string Z we obtained.
Idea 1: Since our construction of the (2, t) non-malleable extractor involves multiple steps of
alternating extraction, we need to first invert the extractors used in these steps. For this purpose,
we will use linear seeded strong extractors in all alternating extraction steps. A linear seeded strong
extractor is an extractor such that for any fixed seed, the output is a linear function of the input.
Thus for any fixed seed, in order to sample uniformly from an output’s pre-image, we can just
sample uniformly according to a system of linear equations, which can be done efficiently.
Idea 2: Next, we will divide the sources X and Y into blocks. In each step of alternating
extraction, we will also divide Qh and Qh into blocks. Then, whenever we use an extractor to
extract from X, Qh or Qh, we will use a completely new block of X, Qh or Qh. When we apply an
extractor to Y to generate Qh or Qh, we will also use completely new blocks of Y to do this. This
ensures that we do not have to deal with multiple compositions of extractors on the same string.
That is, different applications of extractors are used on different parts of the inputs; so to invert
them we can invert each part separately. Note that each alternating extraction takes at most 2
rounds, so it suffices to divide Qh and Qh into two blocks.
Here, we need to choose the parameters appropriately. Let the size of each Sh,j andRh,j produced
in alternating extraction be roughly d, and the size of each block of Qh and Qh be nq. Since in
the analysis of each alternating extraction we need to fix O(t) tampered versions of (Sh,j, Sh,j) and
(Rh,j, Rh,j), we need to have nq ≥ Θ(td). Now in the analysis of the entire non-malleable extractor,
we need to fix O(t) tampered versions of Qh and Qh, and O(tℓ) tampered versions of (Sh,j, Sh,j).
The total size of this is O(tℓd). Thus we can take all t, ℓ, d to be some small enough nΩ(1) such that
the total entropy loss of X and Y is some small nΩ(1). Note that X and Y initially have almost full
entropy. Therefore, we can divide X and Y into O(ℓ) blocks (or even O(tℓ) blocks, for a reason we
will explain below), such that even conditioned on the fixing of all {Sh,j, Rh,j, Sh,j, Rh,j, Qh, Qh}
and all previous blocks, each block still has entropy rate say at least 0.9 (this can be achieved as
long as n/(tℓ) ≫ tℓd). This ensures that each time we apply an extractor, we can use new blocks
of X and Y .
Idea 3: However, there is one issue with inverting a linear seeded extractor. The problem is
that the pre-image size for different seeds may not be the same. For example, if we have a linear
seeded extractor that outputs m bits from an n-bit input, then one can show that for most seeds
the pre-image size is 2n−m, while for some seed the pre-image size can be 2n. If we first generate
the seed uniformly and then sample uniformly from the pre-image given each seed, then the overall
distribution is not uniform over the entire pre-image, due to the above mentioned size difference.
To rectify this, we construct a new linear seeded extractor iExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with
m = d/2 that works for entropy rate 0.9 sources. Moreover iExt has the property that given any
output, for any fixed seed the pre-image size is the same. The idea is as follows. We first take 0.1d
bits from the seed and use an average sampler to sample 0.9d distinct bits from the source. Since
we are using a sampler and the source has entropy rate 0.9, an argument in [Vad04] shows that with
high probability conditioned on the 0.1d bits of the seed, the sampled 0.9d bits from the source
17
also has entropy rate roughly 0.9. Now we take the rest 0.9 bits of the seed and the sampled 0.9d
bits from the source and apply the inner product two-source extractor (or just use leftover hash
lemma), which can output d/2 uniform random bits. Now the point is that given any output and
any fixed seed, the pre-image of the inner product part has the same size,5 and now the pre-image
of any sampled bits also have the same size (since the pre-image is just the sampled bits adding
any possible choice of the other n− 0.9d bits).
Note that each time we apply iExt, the output length becomes half of the seed length. Thus
in the alternating extraction if we start with seed length d, then after one sub step of alternating
extraction, the output length will become Ω(d) since the sub step takes at most 2 rounds. We will
truncate the output if necessary to keep it to be the same length, no matter we choose Rh,1 or
Rh,2 (since they have different sizes). Now we need to use this output to extract Qh or Qh+1 from
Y . Since the size of Qh or Qh+1 is Θ(td), we will take Θ(t) new blocks from Y and apply iExt to
them using the same seed, and then concatenate the outputs. Since the blocks of Y form a block
source, and iExt is a strong seeded extractor, one can show that the concatenated outputs is close
to uniform. We then do the same thing for the next sub step of alternating extraction. Since we
need to repeat alternating extraction for O(ℓ) steps, we need to divide Y into O(tℓ) blocks; while
we can divide X into only O(ℓ) blocks.
Idea 4: Now given any output, our sampling strategy is as follows. We first uniformly generate
X1 and Y1, from whom we can compute V = IP(X1, Y1). Then we know which bits of the codeword
we are sampling. We then uniformly generate these sampled bits X2, Y2 and thus we obtain Z.
Once we have Z, we will now uniformly generate all {Sh,j, Rh,j, Sh,j, Rh,j} produced in alternating
extractions. Based on Z and these variables, we can now generate all the blocks of X used and all
the {Qh, Qh} by inverting iExt. Finally, based on {Qh, Qh} we can generate all the blocks of Y
used by again inverting iExt.
This almost works except for the following problem. The blocks of X and Y generated must
also satisfy the linear equations imposed by X2, Y2, which are the bits sampled from the codewords
of encodings of X and Y by using a linear error correcting code. However, it is unclear what is the
dependence between the linear equations imposed by X2, Y2 and the other linear equations that we
obtain earlier. Of course, if they are linearly independent then we are in good shape.
To solve this problem, our crucial observation is that if ℓ is small and the number of blocks is
large enough (say we divide the rest of X into O(ℓ) blocks and the rest of Y into O(tℓ) blocks for a
large enough constant in O(·)), then the entire alternating extraction steps only consume say half of
the bits of X and Y . Thus, whatever linear equations we obtain from these steps are only imposing
constraints to say the first half bits of X and Y . Therefore, we can hope that the encodings of X
and Y use all the bits of X and Y , and thus the linear equations imposed by these encodings will
be linearly independent of the equations we obtain from alternating extraction (i.e., the second half
bits act as “free variables”).
We indeed succeed with this idea. More specifically, we are going to divide the rest of X and
Y (the parts excluding X1 and Y1, which has length n − n
Ω(1)) into chunks of length b = ⌈log n⌉.
We will now view each chunk as an element in the field F2b . We then take say 0.9n bits and view
it as a string in F0.9n/b. We can now use Reed-Solomn code (RS-code for short) in F2b to encode
this string into a codeword in F2
b
. Note that 2b > n > 0.9n/b, so this encoding is feasible, and it
has distance rate (2b − 0.9n/b)/(2b) > 0.9. Now, instead of using V = IP(X1, Y1) to sample n
Ω(1)
bits, we will sample nΩ(1) field elements from the encoding of X and Y , and then view them as bit
strings. Since the RS-code has distance rate 0.9, again we have that if two strings are different, then
5Except when the seed is 0, but we can deal with this by adding a 1 to both the source and the seed.
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with probability 1−2−n
Ω(1)
, the sampled strings of their encodings will also be different. Moreover,
the sampled bit string now has length roughly nΩ(1) log n, which is still small enough.
Now we can continue with our sampling strategy. As before we first generate all the blocks of X
and Y used in all alternating extraction steps. This only consists of the first half bits of X and Y .
Now, any fixing of these bits can be viewed equivalently as fixing the first 0.5n/b field elements in
a message. Thus we are still left with 0.4n/b free field elements, and we have nΩ(1) linear equations
in F2b according to the RS-code. As long as the number of free variables is larger than the number
of equations (i.e., 0.4n/b > nΩ(1)), the property of the RS-encoding ensures that this set of linear
equations are linearly independent. Thus, for any fixed first half bits of X and Y , the pre-image
according to the linear equations imposed by the sampled bits X2, Y2 has the same size.
Summary. Now we are basically done. Again, given any output, our sampling strategy is as
follows. We first uniformly generate X1 and Y1, from whom we can compute V = IP(X1, Y1). Then
we know which co-ordinates of the codeword we are sampling. We then uniformly generate these
sampled bits X2, Y2 and thus we obtain Z. Once we have Z, we will now uniformly generate all
{Sh,j, Rh,j, Sh,j, Rh,j} produced in alternating extractions. Based on Z and these variables, we can
now generate all the blocks of X used and all the {Qh, Qh} by inverting iExt. Based on {Qh, Qh} we
can generate all the blocks of Y used by again inverting iExt. Finally, we use the linear equations
imposed by X2, Y2 to generate the rest of the bits in X and Y .
To show that we are indeed sampling uniformly from the output’s pre-image, we will establish
the following two facts.
Fact 1: For any fixed Z = z, any choice of {sh,j, rh,j, sh,j, rh,j} gives the same pre-image size of
(x, y). This follows directly from the fact that our linear seeded extractor has the same pre-image
size for any seed, and the argument about the linear equations imposed by the RS-code above.
Fact 2: For different Z = z, and different choice of {sh,j, rh,j , sh,j, rh,j}, the pre-image size of
(x, y) is also the same. This follows because the “flip-flop” alternating extraction has a symmetric
manner. More specifically, no matter each bit of z is 0 or 1, we will use two sub steps of alternating
extraction, with each step taking two rounds of alternating extraction. Thus by symmetry no
matter each bit of z is 0 or 1, the pre-image size of the blocks of X and {qh, qh} is the same.
Moreover, although depending on the h’th bit z, we may choose either rh,1 or rh,2 (or either rh,1
or rh,2), we truncate them if necessary to the same size. So when we generate the blocks of Y
using them and {qh, qh}, the pre-image of the blocks of Y will also have the same size. Thus, the
pre-image size of the blocks of X and Y used for this bit is the same. Therefore, for different Z = z
and different {sh,j, rh,j , sh,j, rh,j}, the pre-image size is also the same.
Now the conclusion that we are sampling uniformly from the output’s pre-image follows from
the above two facts, and the observation that any (x, y) in the output’s pre-image produces exactly
one sequence of z, {sh,j , rh,j, sh,j, rh,j}.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notations
We use capital letters to denote distributions and their support, and corresponding small letters to
denote a sample from the source. Let [m] denote the set {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and Ur denote the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}r . For a string x of length m, define the string Slice(x,w) to be the prefix
of length w of x. For any i ∈ [m], let x{i} denote the symbol in the i’th co-ordinate of x, and for
any T ⊆ [m], let x{T} denote the projection of x to the co-ordinates indexed by T .
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3.2 Min Entropy, Flat Distributions
The min-entropy of a source X is defined to be H∞(X) = mins∈support(X) {1/ log(Pr[X = s])}. A
distribution (source) D is flat if it is uniform over a set S. A (n, k)-source is a distribution on
{0, 1}n with min-entropy k. It is a well known fact that any (n, k)-source is a convex combination
of flat sources supported on sets of size 2k.
3.3 Statistical Distance, Convex Combination of Distributions and Probability
Lemmas
Definition 3.1 (Statistical distance). Let D1 and D2 be two distributions on a set S. The statistical
distance between D1 and D2 is defined to be:
|D1 −D2| = max
T⊆S
|D1(T )−D2(T )| =
1
2
∑
s∈S
|Pr[D1 = u]− Pr[D2 = u]|
D1 is ǫ-close to D2 if |D1 −D2| ≤ ǫ.
Definition 3.2 (Convex combination). A distribution D on a set S is a convex combination of
distributions D1, . . . ,Dl on S if there exists non-negative constants (called weights) w1, . . . , wℓ with∑l
i=1wi = 1 such that Pr[D = s] =
∑l
i=1 wi · Pr[Di = s] for all s ∈ S. We use the notation
D =
∑l
i=1wi ·Di to denote the fact that D is a convex combination of the distributions D1, . . . ,Dℓ
with weights w1, . . . , wℓ.
Definition 3.3. For random variables X and Y , we use X|Y to denote a random variable with
distribution: Pr[(X|Y ) = x] =
∑
y∈support(Y ) Pr[Y = y] · Pr[X = x|Y = y].
We record the following lemma which follows from the above definitions.
Lemma 3.4. Let X and Y be distributions on a set S such that X =
∑l
i=1wi · Xi and Y =∑l
i=1wi · Yi. Then |X − Y | ≤
∑
i wi · |Xi − Yi|.
3.4 Seeded and Seedless Extractors
Definition 3.5 (Strong seeded extractor). A function Ext : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is called a
strong seeded extractor for min-entropy k and error ǫ if for any (n, k)-source X and an independent
uniformly random string Ud, we have
|Ext(X,Ud) ◦ Ud − Um ◦ Ud| < ǫ,
where Um is independent of Ud. Further if the function Ext(·, u) is a linear function over F2 for
every u ∈ {0, 1}d, then Ext is called a linear seeded extractor.
Definition 3.6 (Independent Source Extractor). A function IExt : ({0, 1}n)t → {0, 1}m is an
extractor for independent (n, k) sources that uses t sources and outputs m bits with error ǫ, if for
any t independent (n, k) sources X1,X2, · · · ,Xt, we have
|IExt(X1,X2, · · · ,Xt)− Um| ≤ ǫ.
In the special case where t = 2, we say IExt is a two-source extractor.
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3.5 Conditional Min-Entropy
Definition 3.7. The average conditional min-entropy is defined as
H˜∞(X|W ) = log
(
Ew←W
[
max
x
Pr[X = x|W = w]
])
= − logE
[
2−H∞(X|W=w)
]
We recall some results on conditional min-entropy from [DORS08].
Lemma 3.8 ([DORS08]). For any s > 0, Prw←W
[
H∞(X|W = w) ≥ H˜∞(X|W )− s
]
≥ 1− 2−s.
Lemma 3.9 ([DORS08]). If a random variable B can take at most ℓ values, then H˜∞(A|B) ≥
H∞(A)− ℓ.
It is sometimes convenient to work with average case seeded extractors, where if a source X has
average case conditional min-entropy H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ k then the output of the extractor is uniform
even when Z is given.
Lemma 3.10 ([DORS08]). For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, ǫ)-extractor then it is also a (k+log
(
1
δ
)
,
ǫ+ δ) average case extractor.
The following result on conditional min-entropy was proved in [MW97].
Lemma 3.11. Let X,Y be random variables such that the random variable Y takes at ℓ values.
Then
Pr
y∼Y
[
H∞(X|Y = y) ≥ H∞(X) − log ℓ− log
(
1
ǫ
)]
> 1− ǫ.
We also need the following lemma from [Li12b].
Lemma 3.12. Let X,Y be random variables with supports S, T ⊆ V such that (X,Y ) is ǫ-close to
a distribution with min-entropy k. Further suppose that the random variable Y can take at most ℓ
values. Then
Pr
y∼Y
[
(X|Y = y) is 2ǫ1/2-close to a source with min-entropy k − log ℓ− log
(
1
ǫ
)]
≥ 1− 2ǫ1/2.
3.6 Somewhere Random Sources
Definition 3.13. A source X is a t × k somewhere random source if it comprises of t rows on
{0, 1}k such that at least one of the rows is uniformly distributed. The rows may have arbitrary
correlations among themselves.
3.7 Some Known Extractor Constructions
We use explicit constructions of strong linear seeded extractors [Tre01] [RRV02].
Theorem 3.14 ([Tre01][RRV02]). For every n, k,m ∈ N and ǫ > 0 such that m ≤ k ≤ n, there
exists an explicit linear strong seeded extractor LSExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m for min-entropy
k, error ǫ, and d = O
(
log2(n/ǫ)
log(k/m)
)
.
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The following is an explicit construction of a strong seeded extractor with optimal parameters
[GUV09].
Theorem 3.15. For any constant α > 0, and all integers n, k > 0 there exists a polynomial time
computable strong seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n+log(1ǫ )) and
m = (1− α)k.
We use the following strong seeded extractor constructed by Zuckerman [Zuc07] that achieves
seed length log(n) +O(log(1ǫ )) to extract from any source with constant min-entropy.
Theorem 3.16 ([Zuc07]). For all constant α, δ, ǫ > 0 and for all n > 0 there exists an efficient
construction of a strong seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with m ≥ (1− α)n and
D = 2d = O(n).
We recall a folklore construction of a two-source extractors based on the inner product function
[CG88]. We include a proof for completeness.
Theorem 3.17 ([CG88] ). For all m, r > 0, with q = 2m, n = rm, let X,Y be independent sources
on Frq with min-entropy k1, k2 respectively. Let IP be the inner product function over the field Fq.
Then, we have:
|IP(X,Y ),X − Um,X| ≤ ǫ, |IP(X,Y ), Y − Um, Y | ≤ ǫ
where ǫ = 2
−(k1+k2−n−m)
2 .
Proof. Let X,Y be uniform on sets A,B ⊆ Frq respectively, with |A| = 2
k1 and |B| = 2k2 . Let ψ be
any non-trivial additive character of the finite field Fq. For short, we use · to denote the standard
inner product over Fq. We have
∑
y∈B
|
∑
x∈A
ψ(x · y)| ≤ (|B|)
1
2
∑
y∈Frq
∑
x,x′∈A
ψ((x− x′) · y)

1
2
≤ |B|
1
2
 ∑
x,x′∈A
∑
y∈Frq
ψ((x − x′) · y)

1
2
where the first inquality follows by an application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Further,
whenever x 6= x′, we have ∑
y∈Frq
ψ((x− x′) · y) = 0.
Thus, continuing with our estimate, we have∑
y∈B
|
∑
x∈A
ψ(x · y)| ≤ |B|
1
2 (|A|qr)
1
2 = 2
n+k1+k2
2
Thus,
EY |EXψ(IP(X,Y ))| ≤ 2
n−k1−k2
2
Using Vazirani’s XOR Lemma (see [Rao07] for a proof), it now follows that
|IP(X,Y ), Y − Um, Y | ≤ 2
n+m−k1−k2
2
It can be similarly shown that |IP(X,Y ),X − Um,X| ≤ 2
n+m−k1−k2
2 .
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4 Seeded and Seedless Non-Malleable Extractors
We give formally introduce seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractors in this section. We first recall
the definition of seeded t-non-malleable extractors from [CRS14], which generalizes the definition
introduced in [DW09].
Definition 4.1 (t-Non-malleable Extractor). A function snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is
a seeded t-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ǫ if the following holds : If X is
a source on {0, 1}n with min-entropy k and A1 : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n, . . . ,At : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n are
arbitrary tampering function with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Ud) ◦ snmExt(X,A1(Ud)) ◦ . . . ◦ snmExt(X,At(Ud)) ◦ Ud
−Um ◦ snmExt(X,A1(Ud)) ◦ . . . ◦ snmExt(X,At(Ud)) ◦ Ud| < ǫ
where Um is independent of Ud and X.
We now proceed to define seedless non-malleable extractors, which were introduced by Cher-
aghchi and Guruswami in [CG14b].
We need the following functions.
copy(x, y) =
{
x if x 6= same⋆
y if x = same⋆
copy(t)((x1, . . . , xt), (y1, . . . , yt)) = (copy(x1, y1), . . . , copy(xt, yt))
Definition 4.2 (Seedless Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is a
seedless non-malleable extractor with respect to a class of sources X and a family of tampering
functions F with error ǫ if for every distribution X ∈ X and every tampering function f ∈ F , there
exists a random variable DX,f on {0, 1}
m ∪ {same⋆} which is independent of the source X such
that
|nmExt(X) ◦ nmExt(f(X)) − Um ◦ copy(DX,f , Um)| ≤ ǫ
where both Um’s refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
When the class of tampering functions are 2-split-state, the definition of seedless non-malleable
extractors specializes as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Seedless 2-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m is a seedless 2-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error ǫ if it satisfies the
following property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A = (f, g) is an arbitrary 2-
split-state tampering function, then there exists a random variable Df,g on {0, 1}
m∪{same⋆} which
is independent of the sources X and Y , such that
|nmExt(X,Y ) ◦ nmExt(A(X,Y ))− Um ◦ copy(Df,g, Um)| < ǫ
where both Um’s refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
In this work, we introduce the following natural generalization where the sources X,Y are
tampered by t tampering functions, each of which is from the 2-split-state family.
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Definition 4.4 (Seedless (2,t)-Non-Malleable Extractor). A function nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m is a seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy k and error ǫ if it satisfies the
following property: If X and Y are independent (n, k)-sources and A1 = (f1, g1), . . . ,At = (ft,
gt) are t arbitrary 2-split-state tampering functions, then there exists a random variable D~f,~g on
({0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆})t which is independent of the sources X and Y , such that
|nmExt(X,Y ),nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))− Um, copy
(t)(D~f ,~g, Um)| < ǫ
where both Um’s refer to the same uniform m-bit string.
5 Non-malleable codes via Seedless non-malleable extractors
The following theorem is a straightforward generalization of the connection found between non-
malleable codes and seedless non-malleable extractors [CG14b].
Theorem 5.1. Let nmExt : ({0, 1}n)2 → {0, 1}m be a polynomial time computable seedless (2, t)-
non-malleable extractor for min-entropy n with error ǫ. Then there exists a one-many non-malleable
code with an efficient decoder in the 2-split-state model with tampering degree t, block length = 2n,
relative rate m2n , and error = ǫ2
mt+1.
The one-many non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model is define in the following way:
For any message s ∈ {0, 1}m, the encoder Enc(s) outputs a uniformly random string from the set
nmExt−1(s) ⊂ {0, 1}2n. For any codeword c ∈ {0, 1}2n, the decoder Dec outputs nmExt(c). Thus
for the encoder to be efficient, one need to sample almost uniform from nmExt−1(s).
6 An Explicit Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor
We first set up some tools that we use in our extractor construction.
6.1 Averaging Samplers
In our contsruction, we need to pseudorandomly sample a subset T in [n] such that it intersects
any large enough subset with high probability. It turns out that a stronger sampling problem has
been extensively studied with the following stronger requirement: For any function f : [n]→ [0, 1],
the average of f on the sampled subset T is close to its actual mean with high probability. Such
sampling procedures are known as averaging samplers. We use the definition from [Vad04].
Definition 6.1 (Averaging sampler [Vad04]). A function Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t is a (µ, θ, γ)
averaging sampler if for every function f : [n] → [0, 1] with average value 1n
∑
i f(i) ≥ µ, it holds
that
Pr
i1,...,it←Samp(UR)
[
1
t
∑
i
f(i) ≤ µ− θ
]
≤ γ.
Samp has distinct samples if for every x ∈ {0, 1}r, the samples produced by Samp(x) are all distinct.
The following theorem proved by Zuckerman [Zuc97] essentially shows that seeded extractors
are equivalent to averaging samplers.
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Theorem 6.2 ([Zuc97]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extractor for min-
entropy k and error ǫ. Let {0, 1}n = {s1, . . . , s2d}. Then Samp(x) = (Ext(x, s1) ◦ s1, . . . ,Ext(x, s2d) ◦ s2d)
is a (µ, θ, γ) averaging sampler with distinct samples for any µ > 0 , θ = ǫ and γ = 2k−n.
Using known constructions of strong seeded extractors, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 6.3. For any constants δSamp, νSamp > 0, there exist constants α, β < νSamp such that
for all n > 0 and any r ≥ nα there exists a polynomial time computable function Samp : {0,
1}r → [n]tSamp tSamp = O(n
β) satisfying the following property: for any set S ⊂ [n] of size δSampn,
Pr[|Samp(Ur) ∩ S| ≥ 1] ≥ 1− 2
−Ω(nα).
Further Samp has distinct samples.
Proof. We set the parameter α as follows. Let Ext : {0, 1}n
α
×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be the strong linear
seeded extractor for min-entropy k = n
α
2 and error ǫ =
δ
2 from Theorem 3.14. Thus t = 2
d = O(nαc)
for some constant c. We choose α < νSamp small enough such that cα < νsamp (and set β = cα).
The result now follows by using Theorem 6.2.
6.2 Alternating Extraction
We recall the method of alternating extraction, which we use as a crucial component in our con-
struction.
The alternating extraction protocol takes in two integer parameters u,m > 0. Assume that
there are two parties, Quentin with a source Q and a uniform seed S1 (which may be correlated
with Q), and Wendy with source W . Further suppose that (Q,S1) is kept as a secret from Wendy
and W is kept a secret from Quentin.The protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and
Wendy, and runs for u steps.
Let Extq, Extw be strong seeded extractors. In the first step, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy,
Wendy computes R1 = Extw(X,S1) and sends it back to Quentin, and Quentin then computes
S2 = Extq(Q,R1). Continuing in this way, in step i, Quentin sends Si, Wendy computes the
random variables Ri = Extw(X,Si) and sends it to Quentin, and Quentin then computes the
random variable Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri). This is done for u steps. Each of the random variables Ri, Si
is of length m. Thus, the following sequence of random variables is generated:
S1, R1 = Extw(X,S1), S2 = Extq(Q,R1), . . . , Su = Extq(Q,Ru−1), Ru = Extw(X,Su).
Look-Ahead Extractor We define the following look-ahead extractor:
laExt(X, (Q,S1)) = R1, . . . , Ru
In our application of the alternating extraction protocol, the initial seed S1 is not guaranteed
to be uniform but only has high min-entropy6. We first prove a lemma which shows that strong
seeded extractors work even when the seed is not uniform but has high enough min-entropy.
Lemma 6.4. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extractor for min-entropy
k, and error ǫ. Let X be a (n, k)-source and let Y be a source on {0, 1}d with min-entropy d − λ.
Then,
|Ext(X,Y ) ◦ Y − Um ◦ Y | ≤ 2
λǫ.
6another way to handle this is to use the extractor from [Raz05], but we avoid this to ensure invertibility of the
final extractor.
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Proof. Since Y is a source with min-entropy d− λ, we can assume it is uniform on a set A of size
2d−λ. Thus
|Ext(X,Y ) ◦ Y − Um ◦ Y | =
1
2d−λ
∑
y∈A
|Ext(X, y) − Um|
≤
1
2d−λ
∑
y∈{0,1}d
|Ext(X, y) − Um|
≤
1
2d−λ
2dǫ = 2λǫ
where the last inequality uses the fact that Ext is a strong seeded extractor.
Notation: If Za, Za+1, . . . , Zb are random variables, we use Z[a,b] to denote the random variable
Za, . . . , Zb.
We now prove a general lemma which establishes a strong property satisfied by the alternating
extraction protocol. The proof uses ideas from a result proved by Li on alternating extraction
[Li13a], and in fact generalizes this result.
Lemma 6.5. Let X be a (nw, kw)-source and let X
(1), . . . ,X(t) be random variables on {0, 1}nw
that are arbitrarily correlated with X. Let Y = (Q,S1), Y
(1) = (Q(1), S
(1)
1 ), . . . , Y
(t) = (Q(t), S
(t)
1 ) be
arbitrarily correlated random variables that are independent of (X,X(1),X(2), . . . ,X(t)). Suppose
that Q is a (nq, kq)-source, S1 is a (m,m− λ)-source, Q
(1), . . . , Q(t) are each on nq bits, and S
(1),
. . . , S(t) are each on m bits. Let Extq,Extw be strong seeded extractors that extract m bits at min-
entropy k with error ǫ and seed length m. Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor for an alternating
extraction protocol with parameters u,m, with Extq,Extw being the strong seeded extractors used
by Quentin and Wendy respectively. Let laExt(X,Y ) = R1, . . . , Ru and for j ∈ [t], laExt(X
(j),
Y (j)) = R
(j)
1 , . . . , R
(j)
u . If kw, kq ≥ k + u(t + 1)m + 2 log(
1
ǫ ), then the following holds for each
i ∈ [u]:
Ri, R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1.i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t) ≈ǫi Um, R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1.i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t)
where ǫi = O(uǫ+ 2
λǫ).
Proof. We in fact prove the following stronger claim.
Claim 6.6. For each i ∈ [u] the following hold:
Ri, R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1,i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i], Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t)
≈ǫi Um, R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1,i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i], Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t)
and
Si+1, S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i], R[1,i], R
(1)
[1,i], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
≈ǫi+2ǫ Um, S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i], R[1,i], R
(1)
[1,i], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
where ǫi = 4(i−1)ǫ+2
λǫ. Further, conditioned on R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1,i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i],
(a) (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y, Y (1), . . . , Y (t)), (b) X,Q each have average condi-
tional min-entropy at least (u− i)(t+1)m+k+2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
and (c) Ri, R
(1)
i , . . . , R
(t)
i are deterministic
functions of (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)).
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Proof. We prove this claim by induction on i.
Let i = 1. Since R1 = Extw(X,S1), and Extw is a strong-seeded extractor, it follows by Lemma
6.4 that Extw(X,S1), S1 ≈ǫ1 Um, S1, where ǫ1 = 2
λǫ. Thus we can fix S1, and R1 is still ǫ1-close to
uniform on average. We note that R1 is a deterministic function of X. Since the random variables
S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(t)
1 , Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t) are deterministic functions of Y, Y (1), . . . , Y (t) and thus uncorrelated
with X, we have
R1, S1, S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(t)
1 , Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t) ≈ǫ1 Um, S1, S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(t)
1 , Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t).
We fix the random variables S1, S
(1)
1 , . . . , S
(t)
1 . By Lemma 3.9, the source Q has average conditional
min-entropy at least kq − m(t + 1) = k + (u − 1)m(t + 1) + 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
after this fixing. Using
Lemma 3.10 it follows that Extq is a (k + log
(
1
ǫ
)
, 2ǫ) strong average case extractor. We also note
that R1, R
(1)
1 , . . . , R
(t)
1 are now deterministic functions of X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t). Thus recalling that
S2 = Extq(Q,R1), we have S2, R1 ≈(2ǫ+ǫ1) Um, R1, since R1 is ǫ1-close to uniform and using the
fact that by Lemma 3.10 Extw is a (k + log
(
1
ǫ
)
, 2ǫ) strong average case extractor. Thus on fixing
R1, S2 is (2ǫ + ǫ1)-close to Um on average and is a deterministic function of Y . Since the random
variables R
(1)
1 , . . . , R
(t)
1 are deterministic functions of X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t), we thus have
S2, S1, S
(1)
1 , S
(t)
1 , R1, R
(1)
1 , . . . , R
(t)
1 ,X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
≈ǫ1+2ǫ Um, S1, S
(1)
1 , S
(t)
1 , R1, R
(1)
1 , . . . , R
(t)
1 ,X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
Further, it still holds that (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y, Y (1), . . . , Y (t)). This
proves the base case of our induction.
Now suppose that the claim is true for i and we will prove it for i+1. Fix the random variables
R[1,i−1], R
(1)
[1,i−1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i−1], S[1,i], S
(1)
[1,i], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i]. By induction hypothesis, it follows thatX,Q each
have average conditional min-entropy at least (u− i)m(t+ 1) + k + 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
after this fixing. We
now fix the random variables Ri, R
(1)
i , . . . , R
(t)
i (these random variables are deterministic functions
of X,X(1), . . . ,X(t) by induction hypothesis). Thus by Lemma 3.9, the source X has conditional
min-entropy at least (u− i)(t+1)m+ k+2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
− (t+1)m = (u− i− 1)(t+1)m+ k+2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
after this fixing.
Since Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri) is now independent of X and (ǫi + 2ǫ)-close to Um on average (by
induction hypothesis), it follows that Extw(X,Si+1), Si+1 ≈ǫi+4ǫ Um, Si+1. Thus on fixing Si+1,
Ri+1 = Extw(X,Si+1) is (ǫi + 4ǫ)-close to Um on average, and is a deterministic function of X.
We also fix the random variables S
(1)
i+1, . . . , S
(t)
i+1. Since we have fixed the random variables R
(1)
i ,
. . . , R
(t)
i , thus S
(1)
i+1, . . . , S
(t)
i+1 are deterministic functions of Y, Y
(1), . . . , Y (t). Hence Ri+1 is still
ǫi+1-close to uniform on average and a deterministic function of X after this fixing. Thus,
Ri+1, R[1,i], R
(1)
[1,i], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i], S[1,i+1], S
(1)
[1,i+1], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i+1], Q,Q
(1), . . . , Q(t)
≈ǫi+1 Um, R[1,i], R
(1)
[1,i]
, . . . , R
(t)
[1,i]
, S[1,i+1], S
(1)
[1,i+1]
, . . . , S
(t)
[1,i+1]
, Q,Q(1), . . . , Q(t).
The source Q has conditional min-entropy at least (u− i)(t+ 1)m+ k + 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
− (t+1)m =
(u− i− 1)(t+ 1)m+ k + 2 log
(
1
ǫ
)
.
Recall that Si+2 = Extq(Q,Ri+1). Since Extq is a (k+log
(
1
ǫ
)
, 2ǫ) strong average case extractor,
it follows that Extq(Q,Ri+1), Ri+1 ≈ǫi+2+2ǫ Um. Since the random variables R
(1)
i+1, . . . , R
(t)
i+1 are
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deterministic functions of X,X(1), . . . ,X(t) (recall that we have fixed S
(1)
i+1, . . . , S
(t)
i+1), it follows
that
Si+2, S[1,i+1], S
(1)
[1,i+1], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i+1], R[1,i+1], R
(1)
[1,i+1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i+1],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t)
≈ǫi+1+2ǫ Um, S[1,i+1], S
(1)
[1,i+1], . . . , S
(t)
[1,i+1], R[1,i+1], R
(1)
[1,i+1], . . . , R
(t)
[1,i+1],X,X
(1), . . . ,X(t).
Also, we maintain at each step that (X,X(1), . . . ,X(t)) is independent from (Y, Y (1), . . . , Y (t)). This
completes the proof.
Remark 6.7. We note that if instead of using a strong seeded extractor to generate R1 (recall
R1 = Extw(X,S1)), we used the extractor constructed by Raz [Raz05], then the error achieved is
O(uǫ).
6.3 Construction of Some Key Components
In this section, we construct functions which are key ingredients in all our explicit extractor con-
structions. It is based on a new way of using the technique of alternating extraction, and is inspired
by a recent elegant work of Cohen [Coh15] on constructing local correlation breakers.
We define the following function which is inspired by the “flip-flop” method introduced by
Cohen [Coh15].
We now prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6.8. Let b, {b(h) : h ∈ [j]} be j + 1 bits such that for all h ∈ [j], b 6= b(h). Let X be a (nw,
kw)-source and let {X
(h) : h ∈ [j]} be random variables on {0, 1}nw that are arbitrarily correlated
with X. Let Y, {Y (h) : h ∈ [j]} be arbitrarily correlated random variables that are independent of
(X, {X(h) : h ∈ [j]}). Suppose that Y is a (ny, ky)-source, ky = ny − λ, each random variable in
{Y (h) : h ∈ [j]} is on ny bits. Let Qi be some function of Y on nq bits with min-entropy at least
nq − λ, and for each h ∈ [j], let Q
(h) be an an arbitrary function of Y, {Y (a) : a ∈ [j]} on nq bits.
Let 2laExt be the function computed by Algorithm 1. Let 2laExt(X,Y,Qi, b) = Qi+1, and for h ∈
[j], let 2laExt(X(h), Y (h), Q
(h)
i , b
(h)) = Q
(h)
i+1. Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1} + 10
(
jnq + jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
,
kw ≥ k + 10
(
jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
, and nq ≥ k + 10jm+ 2 log(
1
ǫ ) + λ.
Then with probability at least 1−ǫ′, where ǫ′ = O(2λǫ), over the fixing of the random variables Qi,
{Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, Ri,1, Ri,2, {R
(h)
i,1 , R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, Ri,1, Ri,2, {R
(h)
i,1 , R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]},
{Q
(h)
i+1 : h ∈ [j]} : (a) Qi+1 is ǫ
′-close to Unq and is a deterministic function of Y (b) The random
variables (X, {X(h) : h ∈ [j]}) and (Y, {Y (h) : h ∈ [j]}) are independent (c) X has min-entropy at
least kw − 10
(
jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
and Y has min-entropy at least ky − 10
(
jnq + jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
.
Proof. Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X,Y ), let V (a) denote the random variable
H(X(a), Y (a)).
We split the proof into two cases, depending on b.
Case 1: Suppose b = 1. By Lemma 6.5, it follows that
Ri,2, {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}
≈ǫ1 Um, {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}
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Algorithm 1: 2laExt(x, y, qi, b)
Input: Bit strings x, y, qi of length nw, ny, nq respectively, and a bit b.
Output: A bit string of length nq.
Subroutine: Let Extq : {0, 1}
nq × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m be a strong seeded extractor set to
extract from min-entropy k with error ǫ and seed lengthm. Let Extw : {0, 1}
nw×{0, 1}m → {0,
1}m be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from min-entropy k with error ǫ and seed length
d.
Let laExt : {0, 1}nw × {0, 1}nq+m → {0, 1}2m be the look ahead extractors defined in Section
6.2 for an alternating extraction protocol with parameters m,u = 2 (recall u is the number of
steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random variable that is communicated between
the players), and using Extq,Extw as the strong seeded extractors.
Let Ext : {0, 1}ny × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}nq be a strong seeded extractor set to extract from
min-entropy k1 with error ǫ.
1 Let si,1 = Slice(qi,m)
2 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,1, ri,2
3 if b = 0, let qi = Ext(y, ri,1)
4 else let qi = Ext(y, ri,2)
5 endif
6 Let si,1 = Slice(qi,m).
7 Let laExt(x, (qi, si,1)) = ri,1, ri,2.
8 if b = 0, let qi+1 = Ext(y, ri,2)
9 else let qi+1 = Ext(y, ri,1)
10 endif
11 Ouput qi+1.
, where ǫ1 = c2
λǫ, for some constant c. Thus, we can fix {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, and
with probability at least 1−O(ǫ1), Ri,2 is O(ǫ1)-close to Um. Note that Ri,2 is now a deterministic
function of X. Further, by Lemma 3.11, Y loses min-entropy at most (j + 1)nq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with
probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. Since on fixing Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, the random
variables {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic function of X, {X
(h) : h ∈ [j]}, the source X loses
min-entropy at most jm + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. We now note
that the random variables {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Y
(h) : h ∈ [j]}. Thus,
we fix {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, and by Lemma 3.11, Y loses min-entropy at most jnq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with
probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. Since Ext extracts from min-entropy k1, and ky was
chosen large enough, it follows that the random variable Qi is (ǫ+ ǫ1)-close to Unq with probability
at least 1−O(ǫ1) even after the fixing. Further, we fix Ri,2 since Ext is a strong seeded extractor,
and by Lemma 3.11, X loses min-entropy at most m+ log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ due
to this fixing. Thus Qi is now a deterministic function of Y . We now fix the random variables
{R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]}, noting that they are deterministic functions of X and hence does not affect the
distribution of Qi. X loses min-entropy at most jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1− ǫ due to
this fixing.
We now note that the random variables {R
(h)
i,1 , R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic function of
X, {X((j)) : j ∈ [h]} since we have fixed {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}. Thus, we can fix {R
(h)
i,1 , R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]}
and X loses min-entropy at most 2jm + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ. Thus it follows
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by Lemma 6.5 that |Ri,1, Qi − Um, Qi| < ǫ + O(ǫ1). We fix Qi and Y loses min-entropy at most
nq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
using Lemma 3.11. Finally, we note that {Q
(h)
i+1 : h ∈ [j]} is now a deterministic
function of Y, {Y (h) : h ∈ [j]}. Thus, we can fix {Q
(h)
i+1 : h ∈ [j]} variables and Y loses min-entropy
at most jnq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. Further, Ri,1 is now a
deterministic function of X. It follows that Qi+1 is O(ǫ1 + ǫ)-close to Unq since ky is chosen large
enough. We further fix Ri,1 noting that Ext is a strong extractor and X loses min-entropy at most
m+ log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1− ǫ due to this fixing.
Case 2: Now suppose b = 0. We fix the random variables Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}. Conditioned on this
fixing, it follows by Lemma 6.5 that |Ri,1 − Um| < ǫ1, ǫ1 = O(2
λǫ), with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Since Ext is a strong seeded extractor (and ky is large enough) and Ri,1 is a deterministic function
of X, it follows that |Qi, R1,i − Unq , Ri,1| < ǫ + ǫ1 with probability at least ǫ. We fix Ri,1, and
observe that Qi is now a deterministic function of Y . We can now fix {R
(h)
i,1 , R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]} since
{R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]} is a deterministic function of X, {X
(h) : h ∈ [j]}, and hence does not affect the
distribution of Qi. As a result of these fixings, it is clear that (X, {X
(h) : h ∈ [j]}) is independent of
(Yi, {Y
(h) : h ∈ [j]}). Further X loses min-entropy of at most 2(j + 1)m+ log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability
at least 1− ǫ, and Y loses min-entropy of at most 2(j+1)nq+(j+1)m+3 log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability
at least 1− 3ǫ. Note that now Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Y
(h) : h ∈ [j]},
and Qi is O(ǫ1)-close to Unq . By Lemma 6.5, it follows that
Ri,2, {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]} ≈ǫ2 Um, {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}
where ǫ2 = c(ǫ1+ǫ+ǫ), for some constant c. Thus, we can fix {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]}, Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]} and
with probability at least 1−O(ǫ2), Ri,2 is O(ǫ2)-close to Um. Note that Ri,2 is now a deterministic
function of X. Further, by Lemma 3.11, Y loses min-entropy at most (j + 1)nq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with
probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. Since on fixing Qi, {Q
(h)
i : h ∈ [j]}, the random
variables {R
(h)
i,1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of X, {X
(h) : h ∈ [j]}, the source X loses
min-entropy at most jm + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. We now note
that the random variables {Q
(h)
i+1 : h ∈ [j]} are deterministic functions of Y, {Y
(h) : h ∈ [j]}. Thus,
we fix {Q
(h)
i+1 : h ∈ [j]} and by Lemma 3.11, Y loses min-entropy at most (j + 1)nq + log
(
1
ǫ
)
with
probability at least 1−ǫ due to this fixing. Since Ext extracts from min-entropy k1, (and ky is large
enough) it follows that random variable Qi+1 is O(ǫ2)-close to Unq even after the fixing. Further, we
fix Ri,2 since Ext is a strong seeded extractor, and by Lemma 3.11, X loses min-entropy m+log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probability at least 1 − ǫ due to this fixing. Further Qi+1 is now a deterministic function of
Y . Thus we can fix the random variables {R
(h)
i,2 : h ∈ [j]} since they are deterministic function
sod X and does not affect the distribution of Qi+1. X loses min-entropy at most m+ log
(
1
ǫ
)
with
probability at least 1− ǫ due to this fixing. This completes the proof.
We now construct a function that is a crucial ingredient in our non-malleable extractor con-
structions. (Recall that for any string z, we use z{h} to denote the symbol in the h’th co-ordinate
of z.)
Lemma 6.9. Let z, z(1), . . . , z(t) each be ℓ bit strings such that for all i ∈ [t], z 6= z(i). Let X
be a (nw, kw)-source and let X
(1), . . . ,X(t) be random variables on {0, 1}nw that are arbitrarily
correlated with X. Let Y, Y (1), , . . . , Y (t) be random variables on ny bits that are independent of
(X,X(1),X(2), . . . ,X(t)). Suppose that Y is a (ny, ky)-source, ky = ny − λ.
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Algorithm 2: nmExt1(x, y, z)
Input: Bit strings x, y, z of length nw, ny, ℓ respectively.
Output: A bit string of length nq.
1 Let q1 = Slice(y, nq)
2 for h = 1 to ℓ do
3 qh+1 = 2laExt(x, y, qh, z{h})
4 end
5 Ouput qℓ+1.
Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2. Let nmExt1(X,Y, z) = Qℓ+1, and for
h ∈ [t], let nmExt1(X
(h), Y (h), z(h)) = Q
(h)
ℓ+1. Suppose ky ≥ max{k, k1} + 20ℓ
(
tnq + tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
,
kw ≥ k + 20ℓ
(
tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
and nq ≥ k + 10tm+ 2 log(
1
ǫ ) + λ. Then, we have
Qℓ+1, Q
(1)
ℓ+1, . . . , Q
(t)
ℓ+1 ≈ǫ′ Unq , Q
(1)
ℓ+1, . . . , Q
(t)
ℓ+1
where ǫ′ℓ = O((2
λ + ℓ)ǫ).
Proof. Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X,Y ), let V (a) denote the random variable
H(X(a), Y (a)).
For h ∈ [ℓ], define the sets
Indh = {i ∈ [t] : z{h} 6= z
(i)
{h}}, Indh = [t] \ Indh,
Ind[h] = ∪
h
i=1Indh, Ind[h] = [t] \ Ind[h].
We record a simple claim.
Claim 6.10. For each i ∈ [t], there exists h ∈ [ℓ] such that i ∈ Indh.
Proof. Recall that we have fixed Z,Z(1), . . . , Z(t) such that Z 6= Z(i) for any i ∈ [t]. Thus it follows
that for each i ∈ [t], there exists some h ∈ [ℓ] such that Z{h} 6= Z
(i)
{h}, and hence i ∈ Indh.
We now prove our main claim, which combined with Lemma 6.8 and a simple inductive argument
proves Lemma 6.9.
Claim 6.11. For any h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ℓ}, suppose the following holds:
With probability at least 1− ǫh over the fixing of the random variables {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈
[h], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1, Ri,2 : i ∈ [h]}, {R
(j)
i,1 , R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]},
{Ri,1, Ri,2 : i ∈ [h]}, {R
(j)
i,1 , R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Q
(j)
i+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]}: (a) Qh+1 is ǫh-close to a
source with min-entropy at least nq−λ and is a deterministic function of Y (b) {Q
(j)
h+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]}
is a deterministic function of Y, {Y (j) : j ∈ [t]} (c) The random variables (X, {X(j) : j ∈ [t]})
and (Y, {Y (j) : j ∈ [t]}) are independent (d) X has min-entropy at least kw − 10h
(
tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
>
k + 10
(
tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
and Y has min-entropy at least ky − 10h
(
tnq + tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
> max{k,
k1}+ 10
(
tnq + tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
.
Then, the following holds:
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Let ǫh+1 = ǫh + c2
λǫ for some constant c. With probability at least 1 − ǫh+1 over the fixing
of the random variables {Qi : i ∈ [h + 1]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1, Ri,2 : i ∈ [h + 1]},
{R
(j)
i,1 , R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h + 1]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1, Ri,2 :
i ∈ [h]}, {R
(j)
i,1 , R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h + 1], j ∈ [t]}, {Q
(j)
i+1 : j ∈ Ind[h+1]}: (a) Qh+2 is ǫh+1-close to Unq
and is a deterministic function of Y (b) {Q
(j)
h+2 : j ∈ Ind[h+1]} is a deterministic function of
Y, {Y (j) : j ∈ [t]} (c) The random variables (X, {X(j) : j ∈ [t]}) and (Y, {Y (j) : j ∈ [t]}) are
independent (d) X has min-entropy at least kw − 10(h + 1)
(
tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
and Y has min-entropy
at least ky − 10(h + 1)
(
tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
.
Proof. We fix the random variables {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1, Ri,2 : i ∈ [h]}, {R
(j)
i,1 ,
R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Qi : i ∈ [h]}, {Q
(j)
i : i ∈ [h], j ∈ [t]}, {Ri,1, Ri,2 : i ∈ [h]}, {R
(j)
i,1 , R
(j)
i,2 : i ∈ [h],
j ∈ [t]}, {Q
(j)
i+1 : j ∈ Ind[h]} such that (a), (b), (c), (d) holds (this happens with probability at
least 1 − ǫh. We also fix the random variables {R
(j)
h+1,ψ1(z
(j)
h+1)
: j ∈ Ind[h]}, noting that they are
deterministic functions ofX. ThusX has min-entropy at least kw−10h
(
jm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
−tm−log
(
1
ǫ
)
with probabilitiy at least 1− ǫ. Further, Q has min-entropy at least ky − 10h
(
tnq + tm+ log
(
1
ǫ
))
.
The claim now follows directly from Lemma 6.8.
To complete the proof of Lemma 6.9, we now note that the hypothesis of Claim 6.11 is indeed
satisfied when h = 0. Thus, by ℓ applications of Claim 6.11, it follows that the Qℓ+1 is ǫ
′
ℓ-close
to Unq , where ǫ
′
ℓ = O(2
λǫ + ℓǫ). This follows since for all applications of Claim 6.11 except the
first time, Qh is ǫh-close to uniform, and hence the parameter λ = 0. This concludes the proof of
Lemma 6.9.
6.4 An Explict Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor Construction
We are now ready to present our construction. We first set up the various ingredients developed so
far with appropriate parameters.
Subroutines and Parameters
1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one. Let t = nγ/C .
2. Let n1 = n
β1 , β1 = 10γ. Let IP : {0, 1}
n1 × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 , n2 =
n1
10 , be the strong
two-source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
3. Let C be an explicit [nα , n,
1
10 ]-binary linear error correcting code with encoder E : {0, 1}
n →
{0, 1}
n
α . Such explicit codes are known, for example from the work of Alon et al. [ABN+92].
4. Let Samp : {0, 1}n2 →
[
n
α
]
be the sampler from Corollary 6.3 with parameters δSamp =
1
10
and νSamp = β1. Let the number of samples tSamp = n
β2 . Thus, β2 ≤ β1.
5. Let ℓ = 2(nβ1 + nβ2). Thus ℓ ≤ n11γ .
6. We set up the parameters for the components used by 2laExt (computed by Algorithm 1) as
follows.
(a) Let n3 = n
β3 , n4 = n
β4 , with β3 = 100γ and β4 = 50γ.
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Let Extq : {0, 1}
n3 × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded linear extractor from
Theorem 3.14 set to extract from min-entropy kq =
n3
4 with error ǫ = 2
−Ω(nγq ), γq =
β4
2 .
Thus, by Theorem 3.14, we have that the seed length dq = O
(
log2(n3/ǫ)
log(kq/n4)
)
= O(n2γq ) =
n4.
Let Extw : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong linear seeded extractor from
Theorem 3.14 set to extract from min-entropy kw =
n
2 with error ǫ = 2
−Ω(nγq ).
(b) Let laExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n3 → {0, 1}2n4 be the look ahead extractor used by 2laExt
(recall that the parameters in the alternating extraction protocol are set as m = n4,
u = 2 where u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random
variable that is communicated between the players, and Extq,Extw are the strong seeded
extractors used in the protocol.).
(c) Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n3 be the linear strong seeded extractor from Theorem
3.14 set to extract from min-entropy n2 with seed length n4 and error 2
−Ω(nβ4/2).
7. Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2, which uses the function 2laExt set up
as above.
Algorithm 3: nmExt(x,y)
Input: Bit strings x, y, each of length n.
Output: A bit string of length n4.
1 Let x1 = Slice(x, n1), y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute v = IP(x, y).
2 Compute T = Samp(v) ⊂ [nα ].
3 Let z = x1 ◦ x2 ◦ y1 ◦ y2 where x2 = (E(x)){T}, y2 = (E(y)){T}.
4 Output nmExt1(x, y, z).
We now state our main theorem.
Theorem 6.12. Let nmExt be the function computed by Algorithm 3. Then nmExt is a seedless
(2, t)-non-malleable extractor with error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
We establish the following two lemmas, from which the above theorem is direct.
Lemma 6.13. nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n4 satisfies the following property Pn: If X,Y
are independent (n, n − nγ)-sources and A1 = (f1, g1), . . . ,At = (ft, gt) are arbitrary 2-split-state
tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ [t], at least one of fi, gi has no fixed points, then the
following holds:
|nmExt(X,Y ),nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))−
Un4 ,nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))| ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ = 2−n
Ω(1)
.
Lemma 6.14. Suppose nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n4 , satisfies property Pn (from Lemma
6.13). Then, nmExt is a seedless (2, t)-non-malleable extractor with error (2−n
γ
+ ǫ)22t.
Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X,Y ), let V (i) denote the random variable H(Ai(X,
Y )).
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Proof of Lemma 6.13. We begin by proving the following claim.
Claim 6.15. With probability at least 1− 2−n
Ω(1)
, Z 6= Z(i) for each i ∈ [t].
Proof. Pick an arbitrary i ∈ [t]. Without loss of generality, suppose fi has no fixed points. If
X1 6= X
(i)
1 or Y1 6= Y
(i)
1 , then Z 6= Z
(i). Now suppose X1 = X
(i)
1 and Y1 = Y
(i)
1 . We fix X1, and
note that since IP is a strong extractor (Theorem 3.17), V is 2−Ω(n1)-close to Un2 after this fixing
(with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(n1)). Also note that V = V (i).
Since fi has no fixed points, it follows that since E is an encoder of a code with relative distance
distance 110 , ∆(E(X), E(X
(i))) ≥ n10α . LetD = {j ∈
[
n
α
]
: E(X){j} 6= E(X
(i)){j}}. Thus |D| ≥
n
10α .
Using Corollary 6.3, it follows that with probability at least 1− 2−Ω(n1), |D ∩ Samp(V )| ≥ 1, and
thus X2 6= X
(i)
2 (since Samp(V ) = Samp(V
(i))). This proves the claim.
We fix Z,Z(1), . . . , Z(t) such that Z 6= Z(i) for any i ∈ [t] (from the lemma above, this occurs
with probability 1−2−n
Ω(1)
). We note that by the Lemma 6.15 and Lemma 3.11, each of the sources
X and Y still has min-entropy at least n − nγ − (t + 1)ℓ − nγ/10 > n − n12γ with probability at
least 1− 2−n
γ/10
.
Lemma 6.13 now follows directly from Lemma 6.9 by noting that the following hold by our
choice of parameters:
• n− n12γ > n2 + 20(n
β1 + nβ2)(nγ/C(nβ3 + nβ4) + nβ4)
• nβ3 > 43 (20tn
β4 + n12γ)
• 2n
12γ
2−Ω(n
β4/2) < 2−Ω(n
β4/4).
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.14. Let A1 = (f1, g1), . . . ,At = (ft, gt) be arbitrary 2-split-state adversaries. We
partition {0, 1}n in two different ways based on the fixed points of the tampering functions.
For any R ⊆ [t], define
W (R) = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : fi(x) = x if i ∈ R, and fi(x) 6= x if i ∈ [t] \R}.
Similary, for any S ⊆ [t], define
V (S) = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : gi(y) = y if i ∈ S, and gi(y) 6= y if i ∈ [t] \ S}.
Thus the sets W (R), R ⊆ [t] defines a partition of {0, 1}n. Similarly V (S), S ⊆ [t] defines a partition
of {0, 1}n. For R,S ⊆ [t], let X(R) be a random variable uniform on W (R), and Y (S) be a random
variable uniform on V (S).
Let Un4 be uniform on {0, 1}
n4 and independent of XR, Y S , for all R,S ⊆ [t].
Define
D
(R,S)
~f ,~g
= (Un4 , Z
(R,S)
1 , . . . , Z
(R,S)
t )
where we define the random variable
Z
(R,S)
i =
{
nmExt(fi(X
(R)), gi(Y
(S))) if i ∈ [t] \ (R ∩ S)
same⋆ if i ∈ R ∩ S
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Define the distribution:
D~f,~g =
∑
R,S
αR,SD
(R,S)
~f,~g
, where αR,S =
|W (R,S)||V (R,S)|
22n .
We first prove the following claim.
Claim 6.16. Let
∆R,S = αR,S |nmExt(X
(R), Y (S)),nmExt(f1(X
(R)), g1(Y
(S))), . . . ,
nmExt(ft(X
(R)), gt(Y
(S)))−D
(R,S)
~f,~g
|.
Then, for every R,S ⊆ [t], ∆R,S ≤ 2
−nγ + ǫ.
Proof. If |W (R)| ≤ 2n−n
γ
, it follows that αR,S ≤ 2
−nγ , and hence the claim follows. Thus, assume
that H∞(X
(R)) ≥ n− nγ . Using a similar argument, we can assume that H∞(Y
(S)) ≥ n− nγ .
Let R ∩ S = [t] \ (R ∩ S) = {i1, . . . , ij}. It follows that for any c ∈ R ∩ S, at least one the
following is true: (1) fc has no fixed points on W
(R) (2) gc has no fixed points on V
(S). Thus,
invoking Lemma 6.13, we have
|nmExt(X(R), Y (S)),nmExt(fi1(X
(R)), gi1(Y
(S))), . . . ,nmExt(fij(X
(R)), gij (Y
(S)))
−Un4 ,nmExt(fi1(X
(R)), gi1(Y
(S))), . . . ,nmExt(fij (X
(R)), gij (Y
(S)))| ≤ ǫ
The claim now follows by observing that for each c ∈ R ∩ S, fc and gc are the identity functions
on the sets W (R) and V (S) respectively.
Let X,Y be independent and uniformly random on {0, 1}n. Thus, we have
|nmExt(X,Y ),nmExt(A1(X,Y )), . . . ,nmExt(At(X,Y ))
−Un4 , copy
(t)(D~f ,~g, Un4)| =
∑
R,S⊆[t]
∆R,S ≤ 2
2t(ǫ+ 2−n
γ
).
Thus nmExt is a (2, t)-non-malleable extractor with error (ǫ+ 2−n
γ
)22t.
7 An Explict Seeded Non-Malleable Extractor at Polylogarithmic
Min-entropy
Subroutines and Parameters
1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one. Let t, k, d be parameters such that
t ≤ kγ/2.
2. Let n1 = log
(
tn
ǫ
)
. Let Exts : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n1 be the strong seeded extractor
from Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy 2n1 and error 2
−Ω(n1).
3. Let C be an explicit [ dα , d,
1
10 ]-binary linear error correcting code with encoder E : {0, 1}
d → {0,
1}
d
α . Such explicit codes are known, for example from the work of Alon et al. [ABN+92].
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4. Let ExtSamp : {0, 1}
n1×{0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}n2 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.16
set to extract from min-entropy n12 with error
1
20 and output length n2, such that N2D1 =
d
α ,
where N2 = 2
n2 and D1 = 2
d1 . Let {0, 1}d1 = {s1, . . . , sD1}. Define Samp : {0, 1}
n1 → [ dα ]
D1
as: Samp(x) = (Ext(x, s1) ◦ s1, . . . ,Ext(x, sD1) ◦ sD1). By Theorem 3.16, we have D1 = c1n1,
for some constant c1.
5. Let ℓ = n1 +D1 = (c1 + 1)n1.
6. We set up the parameters for the components used by 2laExt (computed by Algorithm 1) as
follows.
(a) Let n3 = c3tℓ, n4 = 10ℓ, for some large enough constant c3.
Let Extq : {0, 1}
n3 × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem
3.15 set to extract from min-entropy kq =
n3
4 with error ǫ = 2
−Ω(n4).
Let Extw : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n4 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem
3.15 set to extract from min-entropy k2 with error ǫ = 2
−Ω(n4).
(b) Let laExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n3+n4 → {0, 1}2n4 be the look ahead extractor used by 2laExt.
Recall that the parameters in the alternating extraction protocol are set as m = n4,
u = 2 where u is the number of steps in the protocol, m is the length of each random
variable that is communicated between the players, and Extq,Extw are the strong seeded
extractors used in the protocol.
(c) Let Ext : {0, 1}d×{0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n3 be the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15
set to extract from min-entropy d2 with seed length n4 and error 2
−Ω(n4).
7. Let nmExt1 be the function computed by Algorithm 2, which uses the function 2laExt set up
as above.
8. Let n5 =
k
100t . Let Ext1 : {0, 1}
n × {0, 1}n4 → {0, 1}n5 be the strong seeded extractor from
Theorem 3.15 set to extract from min-entropy k4 with seed length n4, error 2
−Ω(n4).
Algorithm 4: snmExt(x,y)
Input: Bit strings x, y, of length n, d respectively.
Output: A bit string of length n4.
1 y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute v = Exts(x, y1).
2 Compute T = Samp(v) ⊂ [nα ].
3 Let z = y1 ◦ y2 where y2 = (E(y)){T}.
4 Output Ext1(x,nmExt1(x, y, z)).
We now state our main theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Let snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n5 be the function computed by Algorithm
4. Then snmExt satisfies the following property: For any ǫ > 0, k ≥ C log2+γ
(
n
ǫ
)
, t ≤ kγ/2 and
d ≥ Ct2 log2
(
n
ǫ
)
, if X is a (n, k)-source, and Y is an independent and uniform distribution on
{0, 1}d, and A1 . . . ,At are arbitrary tampering functions, such that for each i ∈ [t], Ai has no fixed
points, then the following holds:
|snmExt(X,Y ), snmExt(X,A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X,At(Y )), Y −
Un5 , snmExt(X,A1(Y )), . . . , snmExt(X,At(Y )), Y | ≤ O(ǫ),
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Notation: For any function H, if V = H(X,Y ), let V (i) denote the random variable H(X,
Ai(Y )).
Proof. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 7.2. With probability at least 1− ǫ, Z 6= Z(i) for each i ∈ [t].
Proof. Pick an arbitrary i ∈ [t]. If Y1 6= Y
(i)
1 , then we have Z 6= Z
(i). Now suppose Y1 = Y
(i)
1 . We
fix Y1, and note that since Exts is a strong extractor (Theorem 3.17), B is 2
−Ω(n1)-close to Un1 .
Since Ai has no fixed points, it follows that since E is an encoder of a code with relative distance
distance 110 , ∆(E(Y ), E(Y
(i))) ≥ d10α . Let D = {j ∈
[
d
α
]
: E(Y ){j} 6= E(Y
(i)){j}}. Thus |D| ≥
d
10α .
Using Theorem 6.2, it follows that with probability at least 1 − ǫ, |D ∩ Samp(V )| ≥ 1, and thus
Y2 6= Y
(i)
2 (since Samp(V ) = Samp(V
(i))). The claim now follows by a simple union bound.
We fix Z,Z(1), . . . , Z(t) such that Z 6= Z(i) for any i ∈ [t] (from the lemma above, this occurs
with probability 1− ǫ). We note that by the Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 3.11, the source X has min-
entropy at least k− 2n1 and the source Y has min-entropy at least d− 2ℓ with probability at least
1− ǫ.
Lemma 6.13 now follows directly from Lemma 6.9 by noting that the following hold by our
choice of parameters:
• d2 > 20ℓ(t(n3 + n4) + log(
1
ǫ ))
• k − 2n1 ≥
n3
4 + 20ℓ(tn4 + log(
1
ǫ ))
• n3 − 2n1 ≥
4
3(10tn4 + 2 log(
1
ǫ ))
This concludes the proof.
8 Efficient Encoding and Decoding Algorithms for One-Many Non-
Malleable Codes
In this section, we construct efficient algorithms for almost uniformly sampling from the pre-image
of any output of a modified version of the (2, t)-non-malleable extractor constructed in Section 6.
Combining this with Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 6.12 gives us efficient constructions of one-many
non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model, with tampering degree t = nΩ(1), relative rate
nΩ(1)/n and error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
A major part of this section is on modifying the components used in the construction of nmExt
(Algorithm 3) so that the overall extractor is much simpler to analyze as a function, and this
enables us to develop efficient sampling algorithms from the pre-image. We present the modified
extractor construction in Section 8.2. However, we first need to solve a simpler problem.
8.1 A New Linear Seeded Extractor
A crucial sub-problem that we have to solve is almost uniformly sampling from the pre-image of a
linear seeded extractor in polynomial time. Towards this, we recall a well known property of linear
seeded extractors.
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Lemma 8.1 ([Rao09]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a linear seeded extractor for
min-entropy k with error ǫ < 12 . Let X be an affine (n, k)-source. Then
Pr
u∼Ud
[|Ext(X,u) − Um| > 0] ≤ ǫ.
Definition 8.2. For any seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, any s ∈ {0, 1}d and
r ∈ {0, 1}m, we define:
• Ext(·, s) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m to be the map Ext(·, s)(x) = Ext(x, s).
• Ext−1(r) to be the set {(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d : Ext(x, y) = r}.
• Ext−1(·, s) to be the set {x : Ext(x, s) = r}.
We now present a natural way of sampling from pre-images of linear seeded extractors.
Claim 8.3. Let Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a linear seeded extractor for min-entropy k
with error ǫ < 2−1.5m. For any r ∈ {0, 1}m, consider the following efficient sampling procedure S
which on input r does the following: (a) Sample s ∼ Ud, (b) sample x uniformly from the subspace
Ext(·, s)−1(r). (c) Output (x, s). Let Dr be the distribution uniform on Ext
−1(r), and let S(r)
denote the distribution produced by S on input r.
Then,
|S(r)−Dr| ≤ 2
−Ω(m)
Proof. Define the sets:
Good = {s ∈ {0, 1}d : rank(Ext(·, s)) = m}, Bad = {0, 1}d \Good.
It follows by Lemma 8.1 that |Good| ≥ (1− ǫ)2d. Thus, for any s ∈ Good, |Ext(·, s)−1(r)| = 2n−m.
Thus, we have ∑
s∈Good
|Ext−1(·, s)(r)| ≥ 2d+n−m−1.
Further, for any s′ ∈ Bad, |Ext−1(·, s′)(r)| ≤ 2n, and hence∑
s′∈Bad
|Ext−1(·, s′)(r)| ≤ ǫ2d+n < 2d+n−1.5m.
Thus | ∪s′∈bad Ext
−1(·, s′)(r)| < 2−0.5m|Ext−1(r)|. It now follows that
|S(r)−Dr| ≤ 2
−0.4m
We note that ǫ must be o(2−m) for the above sampling procedure to work with low enough
error. However, this would require a seed length of d = O(m2) (by Theorem 3.14). For each step
of the alternating extraction protocol the seed length then goes down by a quadratic factor, which
is insufficient for our application.
To get past this difficulty, we construct a new strong linear seeded extractor for high min-
entropy sources with the seed length close to the output length with the property that the size
of the pre-image of any output is the same for any fixing of the seed. Algorithm 5 provides this
construction.
Parameters and Subroutines:
38
1. Let δ > 0 be any constant. Let d = nδ. Let d = d1 + d2, where d1 = n
δ1 , δ > 10δ1. Let
m = d/2.
2. Let Samp : {0, 1}d1 → [n]t, t = d2, be an (µ, θ, γ) averaging sampler with distinct samples,
such that µ = (δ−2τ)log(1/τ) , θ =
τ
log(1/τ) and γ = 2
−Ω(d1), τ = 0.05.
3. Let IP : {0, 1}d2 × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}
d
2 be the strong 2-source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
Algorithm 5: iExt(x,s)
Input: Bit strings x, s of length n, d respectively.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let s1 = Slice(s, d1). Let s2 be the remaining d2 bits of s.
2 Let T = Samp(s1) ⊂ [n]. Let x1 = x{T}.
3 Output IP(x1, s2).
Informally the construction of iExt is as follows. Given a uniform seed S, we use a slice S1
of S to sample co-ordinates from the weak source X, and then apply a strong 2-source extractor
(based on the inner product function) to the source X1 (which is the projection of X to the sampled
co-ordinates) and the remaining bits S2 of S to extract
d
2 uniform bits.
The correctness of this procedure relies on the fact that by pseudorandomly sampling co-
ordinates of X and projecting X to these co-ordinates, the min-entropy rate is roughly the pre-
served for most choices of the uniform seed [Zuc97] [Vad04] [Li12a]. Thus, we can fix S1, and the
strong two-source extractor IP now receives two independent inputs S2 and X2 with almost full
min-entropy. Thus, the output is close to uniform. Further we show that the number of linear
constraints on the source X is the same for any fixing of the seed. This allows us to show that size
of the pre-image of any particular output is the same for any fixing of the seed. We now formally
prove these ideas.
We need the following theorem proved by Vadhan [Vad04].
Theorem 8.4 ([Vad04]). Let 1 ≥ δ ≥ 3τ > 0. Let Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t be an (µ, θ, γ) averaging
sampler with distinct samples, such that µ = (δ−2τ)log(1/τ) and θ =
τ
log(1/τ) . If X is a (n, δn) source, then
the random variable (Ur,X{Samp(Ur)}) is (γ +2
−Ω(τn))-close to (Ur,W ) where for every a ∈ {0, 1}
r
, the random variable W |Ur = a is a (t, (δ − 3τ)t)-source.
Lemma 8.5. Let iExt be the function computed by Algorithm 5. If X is a (n, 0.9n) source and S
is an independent uniform seed on {0, 1}d, then the following holds:
|iExt(X,S), S − Um, S| < 2
−nΩ(1) .
Further for any r ∈ {0, 1}m and any s ∈ {0, 1}d, |iExt(·, s)−1(r)| = 2n−m.
Proof. Using Theorem 8.4, it follows that X1 is 2
−nΩ(1)-close to a source with min-entropy at least
0.8n for any fixing of S1. Further, we note that after fixing S1, S2 and X1 are independent sources.
We now think of X1, S2 as sources in {0, 1}
d2+1 by appending a 1 to both the sources, so that
S2 6= ~0, and then apply the inner product map. This results in an entropy loss of only 1. It now
follows by Theorem 3.17 that
|iExt(X,S), S − Um, S| < 2
−nΩ(1) .
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It is easy to see that for any fixing of the seed S = s, iExt(·, s) is a linear map. Let X be
uniform on n bits. We note that for any fixing of S2 = s2, X1 lies in a subspace of dimension
d2 −m over F2. Further, the bits outside T have no restrictions placed on them. Thus the size of
iExt(·, s)−1(r) is exactly 2d2−m+n−d2 = 2n−m. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Based on the above lemma, we construct an efficient procedure for sampling uniformly from the
pre-image of the function iExt.
Claim 8.6. Let iExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be the function computed by Algorithm 5. Then
there exists a polynomial time algorithm Samp1 that takes as input r ∈ {0, 1}
m, and samples from
a distribution that is uniform on iExt−1(r).
Proof. It follows by Lemma 8.5 that for any fixing of the seed s, the size of the set iExt(·, s)−1(r) is
exactly 2n−m. Thus we can use the following strategy: (a) Sample s ∼ Ud (b) Sample x uniformly
random from the subspace iExt(·, s)−1(r) (c) Output (x, s). It follows that each element in iExt−1(r)
is picked with probability exactly 1
2d
· 1
2n−m
. Thus the output of our sampling procedure is indeed
uniform on iExt−1(r).
8.2 A Modified Construction of the Seedless (2, t)-Non-Malleable Extractor
We first describe the high level ideas involved in modifying the construction of nmExt (Algorithm
3), before presenting the formal construction.
• We use the linear seeded extractor iExt (Algorithm 5) for any seeded extractor used in the
construction of nmExt.
• Next we divide the sources X and Y into blocks of size n1−δ respectively for a small constant
δ. Since each of X and Y have almost full min-entropy, we now have two block sources, where
each block has almost full min-entropy conditioned on the previous blocks. The idea is to use
new blocks of X and Y for each round of alternating extraction in nmExt.
To implement this however, we need some care. Recall that the alternating extraction protocol
is run for two rounds between either X and Qh, or X and Qh in the function 2laExt. The
idea now is to run these two of alternating extraction by dividing Qh into two blocks, and
using two new partitions of X (each round being run by using a block from either X or Qh).
Now to generate these Qh’s, we use a O(t) blocks of Y , and for each block apply the strong
seeded extractor iExt, using as seed the output of the alternating extraction from the previous
step, and finally concatenate the outputs. This works because these O(t) blocks form a block
source, and using the same seed to extract from all the blocks is a well known technique of
extracting from block sources.
• By appropriate setting of the lengths of the seeds in the alternating extraction, we ensure that
each block of X and Y still has min-entropy rate 1−o(1) even after fixing all the intermediate
seeds, the random variables Qh, Qh and their tampered versions. This can be ensured since
each of these variables are of length at most nδ1 for some small constant δ1, and the number
of adversaries is also nΩ(1)).
• The above modification is almost sufficient for us to successfully sample from the pre-image of
any output. One final modification is to use a specific error correcting code (the Reed-Solomon
code over a field of size n + 1 with characteristic 2) in the initial step of the construction,
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when we encode the sources and sample bits from it. We give some intuition as to why this is
necessary. Since we are using linear seeded extractors in the alternating extraction, by fixing
the seeds we impose linear restrictions on the blocks of X and Y . Now, if we fix the output
of the initial sampling step (the random variable Z in Algorithm 3), we are imposing more
linear constraints on the blocks (assuming we are using a linear code). Now, it is not clear
if the constraints imposed by the linear seeded extractor is independent from the constraints
imposed by Z, and thus for different fixings of the Z and the seeds the size of the pre-image
of any output of the non-malleable extractor may be different.
To get past this difficulty, our idea is to first partition X and Y into slightly smaller blocks
(which does not affect the correctness of the extractor) such that at least half of the blocks are
unused by the alternating extraction steps. Now, we show that by using the Reed-Solomon
code over F = F2log(n+1) to encode the sources, fixing Z imposes linear constraints involving
the variables from these unused blocks, and we show that this is sufficient to argue that it
is linearly independent of the restrictions imposed by the alternating extraction part. We
provide complete details of the sampling algorithms in Section 8.3.
We now proceed to present the extractor construction. Recall that if Za, Za+1, . . . , Zb are
random variables, we use Z[a,b] to denote the random variable Za, . . . , Zb.
Subroutines and Parameters (used by Algorithm 6, Algorithm 7, Algorithm 8)
1. Let γ be a small enough constant and C a large one. Let t = nγ/C .
2. Let n1 = n
β1 , β1 = 10γ. Let n2 = n − n1. Let IP1 : {0, 1}
n1 × {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n3 , n3 =
n1
10
be the strong two-source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
3. Let F be the finite field F2log(n+1) . Let n4 =
n2
log(n+1) . Let RS : F
n4 → Fn be the Reed-Solomon
code encoding n4 symbols of F to n symbols in F (we overload the use of RS, using it to
denote both the code and the encoder). Thus RS is a [n, n4, n − n4 + 1]n error correcting
code.
4. Let Samp : {0, 1}n3 → [n]n5 be a (µ, 110 , 2
−nΩ(1)) averaging sampler with distinct samples. By
using the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 3.15, we can set n5 = n
β2 , β2 < β1/2.
5. Let ℓ = 2(n1 + n5 log n) < 4n
β1 . Thus ℓ ≤ n11γ .
6. Let n6 = 50Ctℓ. Let IP2 : {0, 1}
n6 × {0, 1}n6 → {0, 1}2nq , nq = 10Ctℓ, be the strong two-
source extractor from Theorem 3.17.
7. Let n7 = n− n1 − n6. Let nx =
n7
8ℓ . Let ny =
n7
16Ctℓ . Thus nx, ny ≥ n
1−15γ .
8. Let d1 = 80ℓ.
9. Let iExt1 : {0, 1}
nx × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}d2 , d2 = 40ℓ, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
5.
10. Let iExt2 : {0, 1}
nq × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}d3 , d3 = 20ℓ, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
5.
11. Let iExt3 : {0, 1}
nx × {0, 1}d3 → {0, 1}d4 , d4 = 10ℓ be the extractor computed by Algorithm
5.
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12. Let iExt4 : {0, 1}
ny × {0, 1}d4 → {0, 1}d5 , d5 = 5ℓ, be the extractor computed by Algorithm
5.
13. Let Ext : {0, 1}4Ctny ×{0, 1}d4 → {0, 1}2nq be defined in the following way. Let v1, . . . , v4t be
strings, each of length ny. Define Ext(v1 ◦ . . . ◦ v4Ct, s) = iExt4(v1, s) ◦ . . . ◦ iExt4(v4Ct, s).
Algorithm 6: inmExt(x,y)
Input: Bit strings x, y, each of length n.
Output: A bit string of length m.
1 Let x1 = Slice(x, n1), y1 = Slice(y, n1). Compute ν = IP1(x, y).
2 Let x2, y2 be n2 length strings formed by cutting x1, y1 from x, y respectively.
3 Let T = Samp(ν) ⊂ [n].
4 Interpret x2, y2 as elements in F
n4 .
5 Let x2 = RS(x2), y2 = RS(y2).
6 Let x1 = (x2){T}, y1 = (y2){T}, interpreting x2, y2 ∈ F
n.
7 Let z = x1 ◦ x1 ◦ y1 ◦ y1, where z is interpreted as a binary string.
8 Interpret x2, y2 as binary strings.
9 Output inmExt1(x2, y2, z).
Algorithm 7: inmExt1(x2, y2, z)
1 Let x3 = Slice(x2, n6), y3 = Slice(y2, n6). Let w, v be the remaining parts of x2, y2
respectively.
2 Let IP2(x3, y3) = (q1,1, q1,2), where each of q1,1, q1,2 is of length nq.
3 Let w1, . . . , w8ℓ be an equal sized partition of the string w into 8ℓ stings.
4 Let v1, . . . , v16tℓ be an equal sized partition of the string v into 16Ctℓ stings.
5 for h = 1 to ℓ do
6 (qh+1,1, qh+1,2) = 2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], qh,1, qh,2, h, z{h})
7 end
8 Ouput (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2).
Theorem 8.7. Let inmExt be the function computed by Algorithm 7. Then inmExt is a seedless
(2, t)-non-malleable extractor with error 2−n
Ω(1)
.
The proof of the above theorem is essentially the same as the proof provided in Section 6, and
we do not repeat it. The correctness of inmExt follows directly from the proof of Theorem 6.12,
and the correctness of the extractor iExt (Lemma 8.5), the fact that by our choice of parameters
each block of X and Y still has min-entropy rate at least 0.9 after appropriate conditioning of the
intermediate random variables and their tampered versions, and the fact that using the RS in place
of a binary error correcting code does not affect correctness of the procedure.
8.3 Efficiently Sampling from the Pre-Image of inmExt
Since the construction of the non-malleable extractor inmExt (Algorithm 6, Algorithm 7, Algorithm
8) is composed of various sub-parts and sub-functions, we first argue about the invertibility of these
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Algorithm 8: 2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], qh,1, qh,2, h, b)
1 Let sh,1 = Slice(qh,1, d1), rh,1 = Ext1(w4h−3, sh,1), sh,2 = Ext2(qh,2, rh,1),
rh,2 = Ext3(w4h−2, sh,2).
2 if b = 0 then
3 Let rh = Slice(rh,1, d4).
4 else
5 Let rh = rh,2
6 end
7 Let Ext(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8(h−1)t+4Ct], rh) = (qh,1, qh,2), where both qh,1, qh,2 are of length nq.
8 Let sh,1 = Slice(qh,1, d1), rh,1 = Ext1(w4h−1, sh,1), sh,2 = Ext2(qh,2, rh,1),
rh,2 = Ext3(w4h, sh,2).
9 if b = 0 then
10 Let rh = rh,2.
11 else
12 Let rh = Slice(rh,1, d4).
13 end
14 Let Ext(v[8C(h−1)t+4Ct+1,8Cht], rh) = (qh+1,1, qh+1,2), where both qh+1,1, qh+1,2 are of length
nq.
15 Ouput (qh+1,1, qh+1,2).
parts and then show a way to compose these sampling procedure to sample almost uniformly from
the pre-image of inmExt. We refer to all the variables, sub-routines and notations introduced
in these algorithms while developing the sampling procedures. Unless we state otherwise, by a
subspace we mean a subspace over F2.
We first show how to sample uniformly from the pre-image of 2ilaExt (Algorithm 8), since it is
a crucial sub-part of inmExt. We have the following claim.
Claim 8.8. For any fixing of the variables {s1,i, r1,i, s1,i, r1,i : i ∈ {1, 2}}, and any b ∈ {0, 1} define
the set:
2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2) = {(x3, y3, v[1,4Ct], w[1,4]) ∈ {0, 1}
2n6+4Ctny+4nx :
2ilaExt(v[1,4Ct], w[1,4], q1,1, q1,2, b) = (q2,1, q2,2)}
There exists an efficient algorithm Samp2 that takes as input q2,1, q2,2, b, {s1,i, r1,i, s1,i, r1,i : i ∈ {1,
2}}, and samples uniformly from 2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2).
Further, the set 2ilaExt−1(q2,1, q2,2) is a subspace over F2 of dimension d1, and its size does not
depend on the inputs to Samp2.
Proof. The general idea is that by fixing the seeds in the alternating extraction, each block of w
takes values independent of the fixing of the other blocks of w and the qi,j’s, and similarly the qi,j’s
takes values independent of each other and the blocks of w. We now formally prove this intuition.
Since, s1,1 is a slice of q1,1 it follows that q1,1 is restricted to the subspace of size 2
nq−d1 . Since
r1,1 = iExt1(w1, s1,1), it follows that w1 is restricted to the set iExt1(·, s1,1)
−1(r1,1). Further, it
follows by Lemma 8.5 that this is a subspace of size 2nx−d2 . Similar arguments show that q1,2 is
restricted to the subspace of dimension 2nq−d3 , and w2 is restricted to a subspace of dimension
2nx−d4 . Further, we note that each of these variables have no correlation.
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By repeating this argument for the next two rounds of alternating extraction, it follows that
q1,1 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nq−d1 , w3 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nx−d2 , q1,2 is
restricted to a subspace of size 2nq−d3 , and w4 is restricted to a subspace of size 2
nx−d4 .
Further since (q2,1, q2,2) = Ext(v[4Ct+1,8t], r1) = iExt4(v4Ct+1, r1)◦ . . . ◦ iExt4(v8Ct, r1), it follows
by an application of Lemma 8.5 that for any fixed q2,1, v[4Ct+1,6t] is restricted to a subspace of size
22Ct(ny−d5). A similar argument shows that for any fixed q2,2, v[6Ct+1,8Ct] is restricted to a subspace
of size 22Ct(ny−d5).
Finally, since IP1(x3, y3) = (q1,1, q1,2), it follows that for any fixed x3, q1,1, q1,2, the variable y3
lies in a subspace of size 2n6−log(2nq) since by fixing the variables x3, q1,1, q1,2, we are restricting y3
to a subspace of dimension
(
n6
log(2nq)
− 1
)
over the field F2log(2nq) .
It is clear from the arguments that we did not use any specific values of the inputs given to the
algorithm Samp1 (including the value of the bit b) to argue about the size of 2ilaExt
−1(q2,1, q2,2).
Also note that each of x3, y3, v[1,4Ct], w[1,4] is restricted to some subspace. Since 2ilaExt
−1(q2,1, q2,2)
is the cartesian product of these subspaces, it follows that it is a subspace over F2. Thus the lemma
now follows since we can efficiently sample from a given subspace.
Using arguments very similar to the above claim, we obtain the following result.
Claim 8.9. For any h ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}, any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : i ∈ {1, 2}}, and
any b ∈ {0, 1} define the set:
2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2) = {(v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct] , w[4h−3,4h]) ∈ {0, 1}
8Ctny+4nx :
2ilaExt(v[8C(h−1)t+1,8Cht], w[4h−3,4h], q1,1, q1,2, b) = (qh+1,1, qh+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Samph+1 that takes as input qh+1,1, qh+1,2, b, {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i :
i ∈ {1, 2}}, and samples uniformly from 2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2).
Further, 2ilaExt−1(qh+1,1, qh+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Samph+1.
We now show a way of efficiently sampling from the pre-image of the function inmExt1 (Algo-
rithm 7).
Claim 8.10. For any string α ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ],
i ∈ {1, 2}} define the set:
inmExt−11 (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) = {(x2, y2) ∈ {0, 1}
2n2 : inmExt1(x2, y2, α) = (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Sampnm1 that takes as input {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1,
2}}, α, qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2, and samples uniformly from inmExt
−1
1 (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2).
Further, inmExt−11 (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Sampnm1 .
Proof. We observe that once we fix all the seeds {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1, 2}}, for different
h ∈ [ℓ], the blocks (v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct], w[4h−3,4h]) can be sampled independently. Thus,
by using the algorithms {Samph+1 : h ∈ ℓ} from Claim 8.8 and Claim 8.9, we sample the variable
x3, y3, w[1,4], v[1,4Ct], {v[8C(h−1)t−4Ct+1,8C(h−1)t+4Ct] , w[4h−3,4h] : h ∈ [ℓ]}.
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Finally, since Ext(v[8C(ℓ−1)t+4Ct+1,8Cℓt], rℓ) = (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2), it follows by the arguments in
Lemma 8.8, that the block v[8C(ℓ−1)t+4Ct+1,8Cℓt)] is restricted to a subspace of size 2
4Ct(ny−d5).
Thus, we can efficiently sample this block as well.
Further the variable w[4ℓ+1,8ℓ] is unused by the algorithm inmExt1, and hence takes all values
in {0, 1}4ℓnx . Similarly the variable v[8Cℓt+1,16Cℓt] is unused by the algorithm inmExt1 and hence
takes all values in {0, 1}8Ctℓ. Thus, we sample these variables as uniform strings of the appropriate
length.
Since x2, y2 are concatenations of the various blocks sampled above, we can indeed sample
efficiently from a distribution uniform on {(x2, y2) ∈ {0, 1}
2n2 : inmExt(x, y, α) = (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2)}.
Further since by Claim 8.8 and Claim 8.9, the size of the pre-images of each of the blocks generated
do not depend on the inputs (and is also a subspace), it follows that 2inmExt−11 (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) is a
subspace, and its size does not depend on the inputs to Sampnm1 .
We now proceed to construct an algorithm to uniformly sample from the pre-image of any
output of the function inmExt (Algorithm 6), which will yield the required efficient encoder for the
resulting one-many non-malleable codes.
Claim 8.11. For any fixing of the variable z = x1 ◦ x1 ◦ y1 ◦ y1 and the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i,
rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1, 2}}, define the set:
inmExt−1(qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) = {(x, y) ∈ {0, 1}
2n : inmExt(x, y) = (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2)}.
There exists an efficient algorithm Sampnm that takes as input {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1,
2}}, z, qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2, and samples uniformly from inmExt
−1(qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2).
Further, inmExt−1(qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) is a subspace over F2, and its size does not depend on the
inputs to Sampnm.
Proof. We fix the variables x1 and y1. Let T = Samp(ν) = {t1, . . . , tn5}. We now think of x2 as an
element in Fn4 , F = F2log(n+1) . Let x2 = (x2,1, . . . , x2,n4), where each x2,i is in F. Recall that the
n4 × n generator matrix G of the code RS is the following:
G =

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αn
...
...
. . .
...
αn4−11 α
n4−1
2 · · · α
n4−1
n

where α1, . . . , αn are distinct non-zero field elements of F.
Let
GT =

1 1 · · · 1
αt1 αt2 · · · αtn5
...
...
. . .
...
αn4−1t1 α
n4−1
t2 · · · α
n4−1
tn5

Since x1 = RS(x2){T}, we have the following identity:(
x2,1 · · · x2,n4
)
GT = x1 (1)
Thus, for any fixing of x1, the variable x2 is restricted to a subspace of dimension (n4 − n5) over
the field F.
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Now, let j ∈ [n4] be such that (x2,1, . . . , x2,j) is the string (x3, w[1,4ℓ]), and (x2,j+1, . . . , x2,n4) is
the string w[4ℓ+1,8ℓ]. Clearly, (n4 − j) log n = 4ℓnx, and thus by our choice of parameters it follows
that j = n4 −
4ℓnx
logn =
n4
2 +
n6
log(n+1) <
2n4
3 < n4 − n5.
We further note since any n5×n5 sub-matrix of GT has full rank (since it is the Vandermonde’s
matrix), it follows by the rank-nullity thorem that any j × n5 sub-matrix of GT has null space of
dimension exactly j − n5. Thus for any λ ∈ F
n5 , the equation:
(
x2,j+1 · · · x2,n4
)
αjt1 α
j
t2 · · · α
j
tn5
...
...
. . .
...
αn4−1t1 α
n4−1
t2 · · · α
n4−1
tn5
 = x1 + λ (2)
has exactly |F|(j−n5) solution.
Thus, for any fixing of the variables, x2,1, . . . , x2,j , equation (1) has exactly |F|
j−n5 solutions. In
other words, for any fixing of x3, w[1,4ℓ], x1, the variable w[4ℓ+1,8ℓ] is restricted to a subspace, and the
size of the subspace does not depend on the fixing of x3, w[1,4ℓ], x1. Using, a similar argument, we
can show that for any fixing of y3, v[1,8Ctℓ], y1, the variable v[8Ctℓ+1,16Ctℓ] is restricted to a subspace,
and the size of the subspace does not depend on the fixing of y3, v[1,8Ctℓ], y1.
Now consider any fixing of the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1, 2}}, z. As proved in
the Claim 8.10, we can efficiently sample the variables x3, w[1,4ℓ], y3, v[1,8Ctℓ]. By the above argu-
ment, the variables v[4ℓ+1,8ℓ] and w[8Ctℓ+1,16Ctℓ] now lie in a subspace, and hence we can efficiently
sample these variables as well. Thus we have an efficient procedure Sampnm for uniformly sampling
(x, y) from the set inmExt−1(qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) .
It also follows by Claim 8.10, that the total size of the pre-image of the variables x3, w[1,4ℓ],
y3, v[1,8Ctℓ] does not depend on z or the variables {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1, 2}}. Further,
for any fixing of x3, w[1,4ℓ], y3, v[1,8Ctℓ], z, as argued above, the variables v[4ℓ+1,8ℓ] and w[8Ctℓ+1,16Ctℓ]
now lie in a subspace, whose size does not depend on the fixed variables. Thus, overall the size of
the total pre-image of x, y does not depend on the inputs to Sampnm.
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 8.12. There exists an efficient procedure that given an input (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2) ∈ {0, 1}
nq ×
{0, 1}nq , samples uniformly from the set {(x, y) : inmExt(x, y) = (qℓ+1,1, qℓ+1,2)}.
Proof. We use the following simple strategy.
1. Uniformly sample the variables z, {sh,i, rh,i, sh,i, rh,i : h ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ {1, 2}},
2. Use the variables sampled in Step (1) as input to the algorithm Sampnm to sample (x, y).
The correctness of this procedure follows directly from Claim 8.11, since it was proved that for any
fixing of the variables of Step 1, the size of pre-image of inmExt is the same.
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